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DEATH OF THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
NATALIE NANASI∞
ABSTRACT

Applicants seeking asylum in the United States must demonstrate that they
fear persecution on account of one of five protected grounds—race, religion, national origin, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group (PSG).
The PSG ground has long been the most complex and challenging avenue for relief, and in the Trump era, already precarious protections for vulnerable people
such as survivors of intimate partner and gang violence were further impaired.
The Board of Immigration Appeals’ first, and longstanding, definition of a
PSG in Matter of Acosta required members to possess “common immutable characteristics,” those that, like the other statutory grounds, either could not be
changed or were so fundamental that one should not be required to change them.
This Article reveals that since the Board imposed two additional requirements—
that PSGs possess social distinction and particularity—over a decade ago, the
Board has recognized only two new particular social groups. Both of those
groups, one protecting survivors of domestic violence and the other family membership, were invalidated by Trump administration attorneys general. Thus, when
examining BIA jurisprudence, it appears that the particular social group is dead.
This Article discusses the evolution of the particular social group ground in
both domestic and international law and reviews the disparate treatment of PSGs
by the Board of Immigration Appeals and federal circuit courts. It then makes
recommendations—including legislation, reconsideration of the attorney general’s broad authority to overrule cases using the power of self-referral, and consideration of whether Chevron deference remains appropriate for PSG jurisprudence—for a return to the more equitable, and legally sound, Acosta immutability
test.

∞
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Asylum seekers faced relentless attacks in the Trump era. The former president “consistently characterized asylum as a ‘loophole’ in U.S. southern border
security” and sought to curtail both access to asylum and the rights of those seeking refuge in the United States.1 After instituting a “zero tolerance” policy,2 under
which asylum seekers who enter the United States without authorization are
1. SARAH PIERCE, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRATION-RELATED POLICY CHANGES IN THE
FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 18 (2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
research/immigration-policy-changes-two-years-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/9VLV-TU
GS].
2. Memorandum from the Off. of the Att’y Gen. to Fed. Prosecutors Along the Sw. Border
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policycriminal-illegal-entry [https://perma.cc/7XLH-AZEM].
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criminally prosecuted, the administration separated children from their parents detained pursuant to the new directive.3 A rule promulgated in July 2019 stated that
anyone who had passed through a country other than their own while en route to
the southern border of the United States would be denied asylum if they did not
apply for protection in the transit country.4 The administration placed limits on
the number of individuals who are permitted to enter the United States to apply
for asylum at ports of entry each day; this “metering” policy led to people “waiting
weeks or sometimes months for their opportunity to request asylum.”5 Those who
were able to enter and declare their intention to apply for asylum were sent to
Mexico to await future court hearings.6 Others, including children, are held in
overcrowded and unhygienic detention centers.7 Those who can overcome the
newly heightened standards8 for passing credible fear interviews9 are ineligible
for release on bond if transferred from expedited to full removal proceedings.10
Asylum applicants are no longer entitled to full evidentiary hearings,11 are being

3. See DHS, Fact Sheet: Zero Tolerance Immigration Prosecutions – Families (June 15,
2019), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/zero-tolerance-immigration-prosecutions-family-fact-sheet
[https://perma.cc/F657-SCWX].
4. See Guidelines Regarding New Regulations Governing Asylum and Protection Claims
from James R. McHenry III, Dir., Dept. of Just., to All of EOIR (July 15, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1183026/download [https://perma.cc/4WFP-8TF8]. This followed a prior rule, issued by the former president in November 2018, which barred individuals who did not present themselves at a port of entry from applying for asylum. See Proclamation No. 9822, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,661
(Nov. 9, 2018).
5. James Frederick, ‘Metering’ at the Border, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 29, 2019), https://
www.npr.org/2019/06/29/737268856/metering-at-the-border [https://perma.cc/XB4Q-JUSD] (noting that “19,000 asylum-seekers are waiting on the Mexican side of the border for their chance to
request asylum in the U.S.”).
6. DHS, Migrant Protection Protocols (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01
/24/migrant-protection-protocols [https://perma.cc/N5M8-D5VL].
7. See Andrew Gumbel, ‘They Were Laughing at Us’: Immigrants Tell of Cruelty, Illness and
Filth in US Detention, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/sep
/12/us-immigration-detention-facilities [https://perma.cc/AJ3H-VUMU].
8. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, LESSON PLAN OVERVIEW: CREDIBLE FEAR OF
PERSECUTION AND TORTURE DETERMINATIONS (2019), https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/mkt
/11/10239/10146/2019%20training%20document%20for%20asylum%20screenings.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FC6H-GWFS]. The newly issued lesson plans also removed previously existing guidance
for officers to consider trauma and cultural background when assessing the credibility of applicants.
Id. See also CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR. NETWORK, INC. & AM. IMMIGR. LAWS. ASS’N, CREDIBLE FEAR
LESSON PLANS COMPARISON CHART (2019), https://www.aila.org/infonet/updated-credible-fear-lesson-plans-comparison [https://perma.cc/EX9B-WV5Y].
9. Individuals who enter the United States without authorization and claim fear of returning
to their home country must demonstrate “credible fear” in order to remain in the United States.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.30 (2020). During the credible fear interview, an asylum officer determines whether
there is a “reasonable possibility” that the applicant could establish eligibility for asylum. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.31(c) (2020).
10. See Matter of M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509 (Att’y Gen. 2019).
11. See Matter of E-F-H-L, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
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charged fees for their applications for the first time in history,12 and can be denied
work permits13 as they wait years for their applications to be adjudicated.14 And
after years of methodically chipping away at the rights and dignity of asylum seekers, in June 2020, the Trump administration launched its most significant attack,
when it issued comprehensive regulations that would systematically dismantle
nearly every aspect of our nation’s asylum laws.15
Another significant but underexplored way that the Trump administration attempted to undermine the rights of asylum seekers was by limiting the already
precarious jurisprudence of “particular social group” (PSG), one of the five
grounds for asylum in the United States. Unlike the other bases for asylum—race,
religion, national origin, and political opinion—the particular social group ground
is more subjective and open to interpretation. It is not defined in either international or domestic law, which has led to varied and evolving definitions across
time and jurisdictions. As its jurisprudence has developed, the PSG ground has
provided critical protections to many fleeing serious harms, in particular, harms
that were not foreseen when the asylum regime was created in the aftermath of
World War II, such as intimate partner abuse, gang-based violence, and persecution of LGBTQ and disabled individuals.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the highest administrative body to
interpret U.S. immigration laws, defined particular social group in the landmark
1985 case Matter of Acosta.16 Its definition—requiring groups to possess common
immutable characteristics—drew from international interpretations as well as established concepts of statutory construction. Several PSGs were recognized by the
Board after the Acosta decision,17 but approximately 20 years later, the court

12. See Fee Schedule and Changes to Certain Other Immigration Benefit Request Requirements, 85 Fed. Reg. 46,788 (Aug. 3, 2020).
13. See Removal of 30-Day Processing Provision for Asylum Applicant-Related Form I–765
Employment Authorization Applications, 85 Fed. Reg. 37,502 (June 22, 2020); Asylum Application,
Interview, and Employment Authorization for Applicants, 85 Fed. Reg. 38,532 (June 26, 2020).
14. See Denise Lu & Derek Watkins, Court Backlog May Prove Bigger Barrier for Migrants
Than Any Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/24/us
/migrants-border-immigration-court.html [https://perma.cc/6X4B-PB5E] (describing long delays at
immigration courts, and reporting that “asylum seekers accounted for about half of new immigration
cases [in 2018], at a record 159,590 cases” and that “pending cases have increased by nearly 50
percent since Mr. Trump took office in 2017”); DOJ, Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics - Pending Cases (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file
/1060836/download [https://perma.cc/VC8A-EUXP] (reporting a backlog of nearly 900,000 cases
in U.S. immigration courts).
15. See Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable
Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,264 (June 15, 2020). The regulations impact nearly every facet of
asylum law, including who may enter the United States to seek asylum, who is eligible for a hearing
before an Immigration Judge, and the definitions of key terms in the refugee definition, such as
persecution, political opinion, and particular social group. See id.
16. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part on other
grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
17. See infra Section III.A.
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introduced two new criteria—particularity18 and social distinction19—to the PSG
definition. Since that time, the Board has recognized only two new particular social groups: a group encompassing survivors of domestic violence in 2014,20 and
a group defined by family membership in 2017.21
As was extensively detailed in the media,22 in June 2018, Attorney General
(AG) Sessions issued Matter of A-B-,23 overruling the case that granted asylum to
those fleeing intimate partner abuse. A little over a year later, AG Barr overruled
Matter of L-E-A-,24 the case that recognized family as a particular social group.
The actions of these two attorneys general have effectively eradicated the particular social group ground, as the Board of Immigration Appeals has not recognized
a valid social group that its parent agency, the Department of Justice (DOJ), has
upheld since new requirements were added fifteen years ago.25

18. See Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008) (defining “particularity” as
“whether the proposed group can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently distinct that the
group would be recognized, in the society in question, as a discrete class of persons”).
19. See Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 951 (B.I.A. 2006) (“The social visibility of the
members of a claimed social group is an important consideration in identifying the existence of a
‘particular social group’ for the purpose of determining whether a person qualifies as a refugee.”);
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 227 (B.I.A. 2014) (renaming the “social visibility” element “social distinction,” and holding that “[a]n applicant for asylum . . . based on ‘membership in
a particular social group’ must establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a
common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the
society in question”); Matter of W-G-R, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 208 (B.I.A. 2014) (pronouncing the
same).
20. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389–90 (B.I.A. 2014) (finding that “the lead
respondent, a victim of domestic violence in her native country, is a member of a particular social
group composed of ‘married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship’”).
21. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 42 (B.I.A. 2017) (“We agree with the parties that
the members of an immediate family may constitute a particular social group.”).
22. See e.g., Katie Benner & Caitlin Dickerson, Sessions Says Domestic and Gang Violence
Are Not Grounds for Asylum, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us
/politics/sessions-domestic-violence-asylum.html [https://perma.cc/WD3W-LTM2]; Evan Halper,
Trump Administration Moves to Block Victims of Gang Violence and Domestic Abuse from Claiming
Asylum, L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-sessions-asylum20180611-story.html [https://perma.cc/F83B-EW5C]; Elise Foley, Trump Administration Restricts
Asylum Access for Victims of Gang and Domestic Violence, HUFFINGTON POST (June 11, 2018),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/sessions-immigrants-asylum_n_5b1e981de4b0adfb826c3204
[https://perma.cc/72W6-GGPB].
23. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
24. 27 I. & N. Dec. at 40.
25. As will be detailed, infra Section IV, a small number of federal courts have declined to
follow the BIA’s PSG jurisprudence. Further, because decisions of a federal circuit court are binding
on the BIA when it considers cases arising in that circuit, the PSG is alive and well in those jurisdictions. See Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing NLRB v. Ashkenazy Prop.
Mgmt. Corp., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 (1991) (asserting that “[a]
federal agency is obligated to follow circuit precedent in cases originating within that circuit”)).
However, the BIA’s decisions remain critically important in this area because they provide uniformity and, perhaps more importantly, are a statement of values from the agency tasked with interpreting immigration law.
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This Article describes and explains the particular social group’s evolution and
demise. Section II details the PSG definition in both international and domestic
law. Section III discusses the application of the U.S. definition by the Board of
Immigration Appeals, which has imposed requirements that are unduly restrictive
and inconsistent with international law. Section IV examines the federal courts of
appeals’ review of the BIA’s PSG jurisprudence, with some circuit courts accepting and others rejecting the administrative court’s evolving definition. Section V
proposes ways to resuscitate the particular social group, including through legislative action, addressing the overuse of attorney general certification, and a reexamination of whether Chevron deference remains appropriate for PSG jurisprudence. Section VI concludes.
II.
EVOLUTION OF THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP DEFINITION
The term “particular social group” is not defined in either the international
treaties or domestic statutes in which it originated. Neither the United Nations nor
U.S. legislative history provide insight into the meaning of the term.26 As such,
“[b]oth courts and commentators have struggled to define” the phrase.27 This section traces the origins and evolution of the definition of particular social group,
first in the international community and in its eventual adoption and modification
in the United States, in an effort to better understand its meaning and significance.
A. International Definitions
The grounds for asylum that are widely in use across the world today were
established in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.28 Nations
came together to protect European refugees who had been displaced in the aftermath of World War II.29 Sixteen years later, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees expanded the scope of the Convention to refugees beyond Europeans impacted by the second World War.30 Together, the Convention and the
26. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232 (B.I.A. 1985) (“Congress did not indicate
what it understood [the particular social group] ground of persecution to mean, nor is its meaning
clear in the Protocol.”).
27. Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993).
28. See generally Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
29. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol 1 (Sept. 2011), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/background/4ec262df9/1951-convention-relating-status-refugees-its-1967-protocol.html [https://perma
.cc/KL26-R2P2] [hereinafter UNHCR Convention Background].
30. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. The Protocol incorporates the Convention by reference, stating:
“The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to apply Articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the Convention to refugees as hereinafter defined.” Art. 1, ¶ 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268. The
refugee definition in the Protocol is nearly identical to that in the Convention; only the references to
“events occurring before 1 January 1951” are removed. Id.
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Protocol “remain the cornerstone of refugee protection” to this day.31 The United
States acceded to the Protocol in 1968 and is therefore bound by all the substantive
provisions of the Refugee Convention.32
The Convention defines a refugee as an individual who:
[o]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.33
This refugee definition was developed over a series of meetings at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries held in Geneva in 1951. At the third meeting of the
conference, the Swedish representative proposed an amendment to add membership of “a particular social group” as a ground for asylum.34 In support of his
proposal, he simply noted that “experience had shown that certain refugees had
been persecuted because they belonged to particular social groups. The draft Convention made no provision for such cases, and one designed to cover them should
accordingly be included.”35 At a later meeting, he added that “such cases existed,
and it would be as well to mention them explicitly.”36
The conference unanimously adopted the amendment to add “particular social
group” to the refugee definition without discussion, debate, or comment. Scholars
and jurists have speculated about the drafter’s intentions, suggesting that the PSG
ground was included to protect against persecution for reasons that could not be
foreseen37 or “in order to stop a possible gap in the coverage of the U.N. Convention.”38 But in the absence of a written historical record, a conclusive answer remains elusive.

31. UNHCR Convention Background, supra note 29, at 1.
32. See 1967 Protocol, supra note 30, 19 U.S.T. at 6257.
33. 1951 Convention, supra note 28, at art. 1.
34. U.N. GAOR, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, 3d mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.2/SR.3 (July 3, 1951).
35. Id.
36. U.N. GAOR, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, 19th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.2/SR.19 (Nov. 26, 1951).
37. See, e.g., ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219–
20 (A.W. Sijthoff ed., 1996).
38. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232 (B.I.A. 1985).
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The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)39 attempted
to provide some clarity by issuing guidelines on the particular social group ground
in 2002.40 A product of the Global Consultations on the International Protection
of Refugees, the PSG Guidelines are intended to provide “legal interpretive guidance for governments, legal practitioners, decision-makers and the judiciary.”41
As the Guidelines were issued more than fifty years after the refugee definition
was created, their standards inherently take into account nations’ analysis and application of the PSG ground in the intervening time.
The Guidelines recognize that PSG “is the ground with least clarity” but that
any “proper interpretation must be consistent with the object and purpose of the
Convention,” which requires that the term be understood “in an evolutionary manner, open to the diverse and changing nature of groups in various societies and
evolving international human rights norms.”42 UNHCR then describes two potential ways in which the term “particular social group” had come to be understood
in international jurisprudence—the “protected characteristics” approach and the
“social perception” approach.
A particular social group that is defined by protected characteristics requires
members of the group to possess “a characteristic or association that is so fundamental to human dignity that a person should not be compelled to forsake it.”43
The protected characteristics approach is followed by many “major common law
countries, [including] the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom.”44 Courts in Canada, New Zealand, and the U.K. utilized theories of

39. The UNHCR functions as the “administrative body for the Refugee Convention.” Nicholas R. Bednar & Margaret Penland, Asylum’s Interpretive Impasse: Interpreting “Persecution” and
“Particular Social Group” Using International Human Rights Law, 26 MINN. J. INT’L L. 145, 162
(2017).
40. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, Guidelines on International Protection:
“Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (May 7, 2002), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/3d58de2da/guidelines-international-protection-2-membership-particular-social-group.html [https://perma.cc/H5YB-ZZ8U] [hereinafter UNHCR PSG Guidelines].
41. Id. at 1.
42. Id. at 2.
43. Id. at 3. The Guidelines elaborate on how “[a] decision-maker adopting this approach
would examine whether the asserted group is defined: (1) by an innate, unchangeable characteristic,
(2) by a past temporary or voluntary status that is unchangeable because of its historical permanence,
or (3) by a characteristic or association that is so fundamental to human dignity that group members
should not be compelled to forsake it.” Id.
44. Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a “Particular Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and
Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 48 (2008). The protected characteristics approach is called
“immutability” in the United States. See id. at 47–49. See also discussion infra Section II.B. Professor Marouf details the “significant attention” the “persuasive” reasoning utilized in the Acosta case,
which established immutability as the test for PSG in the United States, has received in foreign
courts. Marouf, supra note 44, at 54–57.
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non-discrimination and human rights—ideas they understood as central to the Refugee Convention—to arrive at the protected characteristics approach.45
A particular social group defined by social perception, on the other hand, “examines whether . . . a group shares a common characteristic which makes them a
cognizable group or sets them apart from society at large.”46 Australia is the only
common law country to define a PSG by social perception.47 Notably, however,
the High Court of Australia rejected a purely subjective approach to social perception, which it believed would be an unreliable indicator of whether a particular
social group existed and also impose a criterion that had no basis in the 1951 Convention.48
The Guidelines review both methods of defining “particular social group” and
ultimately recommend a single definition that merges the two approaches, defining PSG as “a group of persons who share a common characteristic . . . or who are
perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or
the exercise of one’s human rights.”49 The term “or” in UNHCR’s definition is
critical, as it indicates that the analysis should proceed in sequential steps: “[i]f a
claimant alleges a social group that is based on a characteristic determined to be
neither unalterable or fundamental[,] further analysis should be undertaken to determine whether the group is nonetheless perceived as a cognizable group in that
society.”50 In other words, the UNHCR Guidelines do not create dual requirements; a particular social group defined by immutability or protected characteristics alone is sufficient.51
Ultimately, a review of international law reveals that the particular social
group ground stemmed from international agreement, and the definition ultimately
arrived at similar international consensus. Intended to be construed broadly and
with a recognition of its humanitarian origins, a valid PSG under international law

45. Id. at 54–57.
46. UNHCR PSG Guidelines, supra note 40, at art. 7.
47. The High Court of Australia created the social perception approach for defining particular
social group in Applicant A and Another v Minister for Immigr. and Ethnic Affs. [1997] 190 CLR
225 (Austl.).
48. Applicant S v Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Affs. [2004] 217 CLR 387, 421–22
(Austl.).
49. UNHCR PSG Guidelines, supra note 40, at art. 11 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at art. 13 (emphasis added).
51. In a 2009 amicus brief, the UNHCR explained its goal in defining PSG this way as giving
“validity to both approaches, which may frequently overlap.” Brief of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner at 10, Valdiviezo-Galdamez v.
Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011) (No. 08-4564), 2009 WL 8754827, at *10. The agency
confirmed that its intent “was by no means . . . to create a further requirement nor to serve as a basis
to exclude otherwise eligible refugees from protection. . . . [W]hile social perceptions may provide
evidence of immutability or the fundamental nature of a protected characteristic, heightened social
perception is merely an ‘indicator’ of the social group’s existence rather than an additional factor.”
Id.
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is made up of members who possess immutable protected characteristics or who
are perceived as a group by the society in which they exist. As the next Section
will demonstrate, the U.S. definition also includes these requirements but has implemented them in a way that significantly narrows the PSG’s reach.
B. Domestic Definitions
It was not until 1980 that the United States enacted legislation to implement
its obligations under the Refugee Convention and Protocol. When Congress
passed the Refugee Act of 1980, it adopted a refugee definition in the Immigration
and Naturalization Act (INA) that was taken almost word-for-word from the 1951
Convention:
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.52
As a result, “[a]sylum law is one of the most thoroughly international areas
of U.S. law.”53
In another parallel to the Convention and Protocol, the phrase “membership
in a particular social group” is not defined in the INA or in the Code of Federal
Regulations.54 It was not until 1985 that the Board of Immigration Appeals provided the first definition of the term in Matter of Acosta.55
Mr. Acosta was a 36-year-old taxi driver from El Salvador. He founded a coop that became a target for guerillas, who tried to force the drivers to participate
in work stoppages in order to advance their goal of harming the Salvadoran economy. The co-op refused to comply, and the guerillas retaliated with threats, beatings, and murders. Mr. Acosta was beaten and received three death threats that
were similar to those received by others who were ultimately killed. He fled to the
United States and claimed asylum based on his membership in the particular social

52. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018). Accord 1951 Convention, supra note 28, art. 1.
53. Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: Internationalist Paths
Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1061 (2011). See also Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1 (1997) (explaining how U.S.
refugee law draws heavily from international standards).
54. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)(A) (2020).
55. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (“[W]e interpret the phrase
‘persecution on account of membership in a particular social group’ to mean persecution that is
directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a common,
immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or
kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military
leadership or land ownership.”).
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groups of “COTAXI drivers” and “persons engaged in the transportation industry
of El Salvador.”56
In attempting to determine whether Mr. Acosta’s proposed particular social
groups were viable, the Board first had to define the term. The Board began by
utilizing the doctrine of ejusdem generis, a Latin phrase that translates to “of the
same kind” and holds that “general words used in an enumeration with specific
words should be construed in a manner consistent with the specific words.”57 In
this case, the general term “particular social group” appears alongside four more
specific terms—race, religion, national origin, and political opinion. Thus, the
Board found that PSG should be defined in a manner that is consistent with the
other four grounds for asylum protection.58
Applying ejusdem generis, the BIA defined a “particular social group” as a
“group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.”59 The
common characteristic “must be one that the members of the group . . . cannot
change,” like one’s race or nationality, or one that they “should not be required to
change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences,” like
their religion or political opinion.60 Only when defined in this way, the Board held,
“does the mere fact of group membership become something comparable to the
other four grounds of persecution under the Act.”61 The Board further explained
that the shared characteristics that could potentially comprise a particular social
group might be “innate . . . such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances . . . might be a shared past experience such as former military leadership
or land ownership.”62
The analysis in Acosta derived from close textual scrutiny and resulted in a
definition that “is sufficiently open-ended to allow for evolution in much the same
way as has occurred with the four other grounds, but not so vague as to admit
persons without a serious basis for claim to international protection.”63 It also
served as a model for other countries’ PSG definitions.64
The definition established by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of
Acosta remained good law, and led to recognition of several PSGs,65 until a series
of cases in the early 2000s imposed additional requirements for applicants seeking
relief based on their membership in a particular social group. The first of those
cases was Matter of C-A-.66
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 232.
Id. at 233.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 161 (1st ed. 1991).
See Marouf, supra note 44, at 56–57.
See infra Section III.
Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
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The applicant in Matter of C-A- was a Columbian baker who was friendly
with both the head of security for the Cali drug cartel and the General Counsel for
the city of Cali. After sharing information he learned about the cartel with the
General Counsel, both Mr. C-A- and his son were threatened and assaulted. Mr.
C-A- eventually fled to the United States at the recommendation of the General
Counsel and sought asylum based on his membership in the particular social group
of “noncriminal informants working against the Cali drug cartel.”
In analyzing Mr. C-A-’s claim, the Board said that it would “continue to adhere to the Acosta formulation” but “consider[] as a relevant factor the extent to
which members of a society perceive those with the characteristic in question as
members of a social group.”67 Applying this new “social visibility” test to the case
at hand, the BIA found that “the very nature of the conduct at issue is such that it
is generally out of the public view” and could therefore not satisfy the requisite
social visibility.68 Thus, although the Board did not officially make social visibility a requirement at this time, it utilized the concept to deny Mr. C-A-’s claim for
asylum.
The Board in C-A- also noted that the proposed group was “too loosely defined to meet the requirement of particularity.”69 The following year, the BIA
elaborated on the concept of particularity in Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U-, a case
involving a couple who faced threats and feared extortion, kidnapping, and physical harm as a result of their status as, and membership in the particular social
group of, “affluent Guatemalans.”70 The Board held that the proposed group was
“too amorphous to provide an adequate benchmark for determining group membership” and denied the couple’s claim.71 Particularity was thus cemented as a
mandatory element of the PSG definition, and groups that were “too subjective,
inchoate, and variable” were no longer considered valid.72 Additionally, the BIA
used Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U- as an opportunity to reaffirm social visibility,
recognizing it as a required factor in the particular social group analysis.73
A year after Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U-, the Board issued companion decisions that shed more light on its views regarding the definition of “particular social

67. Id. at 956–57.
68. Id. at 960.
69. Id. at 957 (emphasis added).
70. 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 70–71 (B.I.A. 2007).
71. Id. at 76.
72. Id. After Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, the Board also determined that the terms “young,”
see Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584–88 (B.I.A. 2008); and “poverty,” see Matter of
M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239–40 (B.I.A. 2014) (citing Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363,
368 (3d Cir. 2005)); were too subjective and amorphous to satisfy the requirement of particularity.
73. The Board stated: “In reaffirming the requirement that the shared characteristic of the
group should generally be recognizable by others in the community. . . .” Matter of A-M-E- &
J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 74 (emphasis added).
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group”—Matter of S-E-G-74 and Matter of E-A-G-.75 Both cases involved young
men fleeing violent gangs in El Salvador; when issued, they were the BIA’s most
comprehensive articulation of the social visibility and particularity requirements
to date.76 Blurring the lines between the two requirements, the Board in Matter of
S-E-G- described “the essence of the particularity requirement” as “whether the
proposed group can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently distinct that
the group would be recognized, in the society in question, as a discrete class of
persons.”77 “The key question,” according to the Board, was “whether the proposed description is sufficiently ‘particular’ or is ‘too amorphous . . . to create a
benchmark for determining group membership.’”78 Both decisions also addressed
social visibility and ultimately concluded that the proposed gang-based PSGs were
insufficiently visible.79 As the Board stated in Matter of S-E-G-, “the respondents
are . . . not in a substantially different situation from anyone who has crossed the
gang, or who is perceived to be a threat to the gang’s interests” because “gangs
have directed harm against anyone and everyone perceived to have interfered with,
or who might present a threat to, their criminal enterprises and territorial power.”80
Another key step in the Board of Immigration Appeals’ efforts to define “particular social group” was a second set of companion cases: Matter of M-E-V-G-81
and Matter of W-G-R-.82 The cases were issued in response to federal courts’ calls
for “more clarity” about the Board’s PSG framework.83 The facts in both cases
once again centered around young men from Central America fleeing gang-based
violence. The PSG articulated in Matter of M-E-V-G- was “Honduran youth who
have been actively recruited by gangs but who have refused to join because they
oppose the gangs.”84 Mr. W-G-R- asserted, as his basis for protection, the PSG
“former members of the Mara 18 gang in El Salvador who have renounced their
gang membership.”85
The Board used the cases as a vehicle to rename social visibility as “social
distinction.” Emphasizing that the decisions did not constitute “a new
74. 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008).
75. 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (B.I.A. 2008).
76. The proposed PSG in S-E-G- was “Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to recruitment efforts by the MS-13 gang and who have rejected or resisted membership in the gang based on
their own personal, moral, and religious opposition to the gang’s values and activities” and “family
members of such Salvadoran youth.” 24 I. & N. Dec. at 581. The proposed PSG in E-A-G- was
“persons resistant to gang membership.” 24 I. & N. Dec. at 593.
77. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 584.
78. Id. (quoting Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 628–29 (8th Cir. 2008)).
79. E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 593–96; Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 587.
80. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 587.
81. 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014).
82. 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014).
83. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 236. An in-depth discussion about the concerns
expressed by both the federal judiciary and legal scholars can be found infra Section II.B.1.
84. 26 I. & N. Dec. at 228.
85. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 209.
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interpretation,”86 but instead a further explanation of the visibility requirement,
the Board clarified that social visibility “was never intended to, and does not require, literal or ‘ocular’ visibility,” as critics had argued. 87 In doing so, the Board
implicitly addressed concerns about the validity of groups like Matter of C-A-’s
“noncriminal informants,” LGBT individuals, or survivors of intimate partner violence, who by definition, or for their own safety and protection, were hidden from
public view and were thus not actually visible to those in the applicant’s society,
including persecutors.88
Thus, after eight years of post-Acosta tinkering, the Board’s definition of
“particular social group” seems to have settled on three required elements: 1) immutability, 2) social distinction, and 3) particularity.
1. Critiques of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ Approach
The definition of “particular social group” promulgated by the Board of Immigration Appeals has been the subject of robust critique. First, as detailed in Section II.A, the UNHCR PSG Guidelines provide critical guidance on international
interpretations of the phrase “particular social group.” The PSG definition suggested by the Guidelines incorporates both the Acosta immutability approach and
the “social perception” or “social distinction” approach. However, UNHCR considers these to be alternative, as opposed to dual, requirements. As former Immigration Judge (IJ) and Senior Advisor to the BIA Jeffrey Chase stated, “by
changing the ‘or’ to an ‘and,’ the Board required applicants to establish both
immutability and social distinction, thus narrowing the ranks of those able to
qualify,” which is contrary to UNHCR’s intent.89 As such, when the Board cited
to the Guidelines to support its addition of what was then called social visibility
to the PSG definition,90 this “justification . . . was most disingenuous.”91
Another significant concern relates to the Board’s abandonment of traditional
standards of statutory interpretation. As discussed above, in arriving at its initial
definition of PSG, the Board utilized the principle of ejusdem generis, which requires words in a group or series to be construed in a manner consistent with one

86. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 253 n.9. The Board further noted that the M-E-VG- decision was not a departure from precedent and that the Board still “adhere[d] to [its] prior
interpretations of [visibility].” Id. at 228, 247.
87. Id. at 234.
88. Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006). See also Marouf, supra note 44,
at 79–88 (discussing the challenges of demonstrating ocular visibility for claims based on sexual
orientation both because “sexual orientation is not externally visible, and sexual minorities often feel
compelled to hide their orientation for various reasons”).
89. Jeffrey S. Chase, The Immigration Court: Issues and Solutions, Lecture at Cornell Law
School’s Berger International Speaker Series (Mar. 28, 2019) (transcript available at
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/3/28/i6el1do6l5p443u1nkf8vwr28dv9qi [https://perma
.cc/CKH2-74ZN]).
90. Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956, 960.
91. Chase, supra note 89.
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another.92 Matter of Acosta created the immutability test for particular social
group because the other bases for asylum—race, religion, national origin, and political opinion—are similarly immutable. No additional criterial are required to
prove the non-PSG asylum grounds. Thus, “the adoption of social visibility signaled abandonment by the Board of an approach that interpreted the PSG ground
homogenously with the [other asylum] grounds.”93
The non-PSG grounds do not require proof of social distinction and particularity. For example, in Matter of S-A-, the BIA found that a young Moroccan
woman was persecuted by her father because her liberal Muslim beliefs differed
from his conservative religious views, specifically as related to the role of
women.94 In that case, the Board did not inquire whether Ms. S-A-’s religious
views were publicly known or whether Muslims were too amorphous of a group
to receive protection. The Board simply recognized that Ms. S-A- had been persecuted on account of her religion and granted her relief. Similarly, the law does not
require inquiry beyond evidence of nationality if, for example, a woman claims
persecution in Eritrea based on her Ethiopian ancestry.95 As such, because the
BIA’s “particular social group” definition demands more than what is needed to
prove the other four grounds for asylum, it violates the principle of ejusdem generis.
The social distinction and particularity requirements are also mutually exclusive. In demanding both elements to satisfy the PSG definition, the Board has created an impossible needle to thread. If a proposed group is too big, it risks not
satisfying the particularity requirement. As the BIA has said, “major segments of
the population will rarely, if ever, constitute a distinct social group.”96 Yet, if a
group is defined discretely enough to be sufficiently particular, it could fail to satisfy the requirement of social distinction, because a small group is unlikely to be
perceived as a group by society.
This catch-22 is not the only one relating to size. The Board’s claim that large
or numerous groups are not viable PSGs is also inconsistent with the way it analyzes the other grounds for asylum. For example, 34% of Lebanese citizens are
Christians, a total of nearly two million people.97 Christians account for approximately “10% of Syria’s 22 million people.”98 Yet if a Christian sought asylum
from one of these majority-Muslim countries based on religious persecution, an
92. See supra text accompanying notes 57–59.
93. Helen P. Grant, Survival of Only the Fittest Social Groups: The Evolutionary Impact of
Social Distinction and Particularity, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 895, 910 (2017).
94. 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (B.I.A. 2000).
95. See Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 545 (7th Cir. 2006).
96. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239.
97. CIA, Lebanon, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/le.html#field-anchor-people-and-society-religions [https://perma.cc/3J3W-6K
AH] (Dec. 17, 2020).
98. Syria’s Beleaguered Christians, BBC (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-22270455 [https://perma.cc/56U2-7GAP].
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immigration court would not be required to deny the claim because too many other
Christians were at risk of harm. Nor would a group composed of Christians be
considered “too subjective, inchoate, and variable” even though it could be made
up of multiple denominations or individuals with diverse levels of religious observance.99
What is likely at the root of these “numerosity” limitations is a fear of opening
the floodgates; in other words, the fear that recognizing a broad group will lead to
an overwhelming influx of asylum seekers from that group into the United States.
Yet such concerns are supported neither by the law nor the reality of migration.
As the UNHCR Guidelines plainly state, “the fact that large numbers of persons
risk persecution cannot be a ground for refusing to extend international protection
where it is otherwise appropriate.”100 U.S. courts agree: the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, for one, asserted that it is “antithetical to asylum law to deny refuge
to a group of persecuted individuals . . . merely because too many have valid
claims.”101 Even the BIA has recognized that humanitarian immigration law
should not be influenced by political concerns, noting that the “distinction between
the goals of refugee law (which protects individuals) and politics (which manages
the relations between political bodies) should not be confused.”102
Fear that an expansive definition of particular social group will lead to skyrocketing claims also ignores historical reality. As Professor Karen Musalo explains, opponents of gender-based asylum evoked floodgate concerns as the U.S.
immigration court system considered a PSG that would provide protection for survivors of female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C).103 Yet, after Matter of
Kasinga104 established the right to asylum for women who feared FGM/C, “the
dire predictions of a flood of women seeking asylum never materialized.”105 Similarly, when Canada recognized gender as a basis for asylum, gender-based claims
“actually declined.”106 The absence of a rise in claims after a change that applied

99. Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007) (quoting the Board’s
assessment of the characteristic of wealth with regard to a proposed—and rejected—PSG of
“wealthy Guatemalans”).
100. UNHCR PSG Guidelines, supra note 40, at 5.
101. Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 675 (7th Cir. 2013). See also Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d
1125, 1135 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The BIA’s statement of the purpose and function of the ‘particularity’
requirement does not, on its face, impose a numerical limit on a proposed social group or disqualify
groups that exceed specific breadth or size limitations.”).
102. Matter of S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 492–93 (B.I.A. 1996).
103. Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of Floodgates or Call
to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119, 132–33 (2007).
104. 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
105. Musalo, supra note 103, at 132.
106. Id. at 133. As Professor Musalo explains, “the number of women asylum seekers has not
dramatically increased with the legal recognition of gender claims for protection” for a number of
reasons, including women’s inability to leave their home countries to seek protection, caretaking
responsibilities, and lack of resources. Id.
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to such a significant portion to the world’s population poses a serious challenge to
arguments based on a fear of opening the floodgates.
Moreover, Canada is not alone in its willingness to accept broad groups as
PSGs. As Professor Maryellen Fullerton explains, neither the Canadian nor German governments have allowed concerns about size “to influence the development
of the social group concept.”107 Instead, “they have recognized that other elements
of the refugee definition will narrow the pool of those who have claims to refugee
status.”108 For example, even with an expansive PSG definition, the INA still requires asylum seekers to prove that they suffered or fear harm that amounts to
persecution, that the persecution was perpetrated on account of a protected ground,
and that the government is either the persecutor or is unable or unwilling to protect
them from the persecutor.109 Numerous bars to asylum, including for those who
did not apply within one year of entering the United States,110 have been found to

107. Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due
to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 505, 561 (1993).
108. Id.
109. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018).
110. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2012) (stating that applicants are ineligible for asylum
unless they demonstrate “by clear and convincing evidence that the application has been filed within
1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the United States.”). Scholars and advocates alike have
critiqued the requirement to file for asylum within one year of entry as unduly restrictive. See, e.g.,
Roy Xiao, Refuge from Time: How the One-Year Filing Deadline Unfairly Frustrates Valid Asylum
Claims, 95 N.C. L. REV. 523 (2017) (critiquing the one-year asylum filing deadline); Nat’l Immigrant Just. Ctr., Report: The One-Year Asylum Deadline and the BIA: No Protection, No Process
(Oct. 21, 2010), https://immigrantjustice.org/research-items/report-one-year-asylum-deadline-andbia-no-protection-no-process [https://perma.cc/R5YZ-5FHK] (examining how the BIA has ruled on
issues concerning the one-year filing deadline).
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have persecuted others,111 or have been convicted of a particularly serious
crime112 or an aggravated felony113 in the United States, also apply.
Lastly, but importantly, the current definition of “particular social group” presents significant disadvantages to pro se litigants. Because asylum seekers do not
have the right to counsel at government expense, a significant percentage of applicants appear in immigration court without an attorney.114 An unrepresented migrant faces substantial obstacles in establishing and proving membership in a postAcosta particular social group. Language barriers,115 trauma, and lack of familiarity with the U.S. legal system present significant challenges in formulating a
group that would be sufficiently immutable, socially distinct, and particular. The
impact of these issues was exacerbated by the BIA’s holding in Matter of W-Y-C& H-O-B-, which permits an immigration judge to summarily deny the claim of
an asylum seeker who fails to articulate a viable PSG in an initial hearing.116

111. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(2)(E) (2020); Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811
(B.I.A. 1988) (holding that asylum applicants who were persecutors of others are barred from asylum
relief). The “persecutor bar” has faced criticism for lacking nuance and preventing legitimate victims
from accessing asylum protection. See, e.g., Kathryn White, A Chance for Redemption: Revising the
“Persecutor Bar” and “Material Support Bar” in the Case of Child Soldiers, 43 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 191, 222 (2010); Lori K. Walls, The Persecutor Bar in U.S. Immigration Law: Toward a More Nuanced Understanding of Modern “Persecution” in the Case of Forced Abortion and
Female Genital Cutting, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 227, 228 (2007); Nicole Lerescu, Barring Too
Much: An Argument in Favor of Interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act Section 101(a)(42)
to Include a Duress Exception, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1875, 1889–90 (2007).
112. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(2)(A) (2020). Scholars and advocates have argued that the “particularly serious crime” bar is unduly expansive and severe. See, e.g., Mary Holper, Redefining “Particularly Serious Crimes” in Refugee Law, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (2017); Rebecca Sharpless, Balancing Future Harms: The “Particularly Serious Crime” Bar to Refugee Protection, 69
FLA. L. REV. F. 27, 29–30 (2017); Fatma Marouf, Response to Professor Holper’s Article, Redefining “Particularly Serious Crimes” in Refugee Law, 69 FLA. L. REV. F. 32, 38 (2017). See generally
PHILIP L. TORREY, CLARISSA LEHNE, COLLIN POIROT, MANUEL D. VARGAS & JARED FRIEDBERG,
IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, UNITED STATES FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REFUGEE CONVENTION:
MISAPPLICATION OF THE PARTICULARLY SERIOUS CRIME BAR TO DENY REFUGEES PROTECTION FROM
REMOVAL TO COUNTRIES WHERE THEIR LIFE OR FREEDOM IS THREATENED (2018), https://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/IDP_Harvard_Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc
/C542-PXF4].
113. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(2)(D) (2020). The aggravated felony bar is a sweeping limit to asylum access, having “been interpreted broadly to reach misdemeanor offenses such as shoplifting and
other types of conduct that would not normally be considered ‘aggravated’ or ‘felonious.’” Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Policy and Politics of Immigrant Rights, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
387, 394 (2007).
114. A study of cases decided between 2007 and 2012 found that only 37% of all immigrants,
and 14% of detained immigrants, secured representation in immigration court. Ingrid V. Eagly &
Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(2015).
115. The Trump administration eliminated interpretation services for initial hearings in immigration court. See Tal Kopan, Trump Administration Ending In-Person Interpreters at Immigrants’
First Hearings, S.F. CHRON. (July 3, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Trump-administration-ending-in-person-14070403.php [https://perma.cc/Y77K-SAQC].
116. 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 191 (B.I.A. 2018).
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Moreover, the BIA’s heightened PSG standard requires significant proof.117
The Board has explained that “[e]vidence such as country conditions reports, expert witness testimony, and press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies,
historical animosities, and the like may establish that a group exists and is perceived as ‘distinct’ or ‘other’ in a particular society.”118 Obtaining such corroboration of social distinction is challenging even with an attorney, but likely impossible for the typical asylum applicant who faces significant financial, logistical,
and psychological constraints.119
In sum, the Board of Immigration Appeals’ PSG definition ignores international guidelines, is discordant with the other asylum grounds, is internally inconsistent, relies on unproven floodgates narratives, and harms pro se asylum seekers.
These concerns prompted challenges to the definition in federal courts; a discussion of that jurisprudence follows in Section IV, after a review of how the BIA
and DOJ implemented the PSG definition.
III.
APPLICATION BY THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
The Board of Immigration Appeals’ evolving definition of “particular social
group” led to a varied line of cases from the court after its initial decision in 1985.
The Board recognized a number of PSGs after Acosta, but when the requirements
of social visibility/distinction and particularity were introduced, the rate of PSG
recognition slowed dramatically. Eventually, the only two PSGs recognized after
the BIA added new elements to the definition were overruled by Trump administration attorneys general. Put another way, since adding additional criteria to the

117. This is particularly true because petitioners bear the burden of proof in an asylum case,
which is heard in an adversarial system. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (2020) (“The burden of proof is on
the applicant for asylum to establish that he or she is a refugee as defined in section 101(a)(42) of
the Act.”).
118. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 244 (B.I.A. 2014).
119. See Joline Doedens, The Politics of Domestic Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 22 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 111, 125 (2014) (describing the “fact-intensive” process involved in demonstrating asylum based on intimate partner violence, a claim almost certain to be based on membership
in a particular social group); Sarah R. Goodman, Asking for Too Much? The Role of Corroborating
Evidence in Asylum Proceedings in the United States and United Kingdom, 36 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 1733, 1739–42 (2013) (concluding that evidentiary requirements are unrealistic when considering the situation of refugees).
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Acosta definition, no particular social groups have survived BIA and DOJ scrutiny.120
A. Particular Social Groups Recognized Under the Acosta Immutability Test
Although it denied the proposed PSGs in Matter of Acosta, the Board of Immigration Appeals soon thereafter issued a series of precedent decisions recognizing several new particular social groups based on its newly created PSG test.121
In Matter of Fuentes, the Board found that former members of the national police
of El Salvador were a valid PSG.122 A few years later, in the landmark case Matter
of Toboso-Alfonso, the Board recognized persecution based on sexual orientation
as a basis for asylum.123
In Matter of H-, the Board held that “members of the Marehan subclan of
Somalia who share ties of kinship and linguistic commonalities” constitute a particular social group.124 In reaching its conclusion, the Board reasoned that “clan
membership is a highly recognizable, immutable characteristic that is acquired at
birth and is inextricably linked to family ties.”125

120. As of March 2021. Some examples of particular social groups the Board rejected after
imposition of the particularity and visibility/distinction criteria include “secularized and westernized
Pakistanis perceived to be affiliated with the United States,” Ahmed v. Holder, 611 F.3d 90, 91 (1st
Cir. 2010); “Guatemalan citizens who [do] not sport gang colors and tattoos,” Paiz-Morales v.
Lynch, 795 F.3d 238, 240 (1st Cir. 2015); “women with children whose husbands live and work in
the U.S. and it is known to society as a whole that the husbands live in the U.S.,” Granada-Rubio v.
Lynch, 814 F.3d 35, 39 (1st Cir. 2016); “young Albanian women between the ages of 15 and 25,”
Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 193 (2d Cir. 2014); “individuals with bipolar disorder who exhibit
erratic behavior,” Temu v. Holder, 740 F.3d 887, 890 (4th Cir. 2014); “active and long-term former
gang members,” Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 497 (6th Cir. 2015); “truckers who, because of their anti-FARC views and actions, have collaborated with law enforcement and refused to
cooperate with FARC,” Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 545 (7th Cir. 2011); “effective honest
police,” R.R.D. v. Holder, 746 F.3d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 2014); “family business owners” in Guatemala, Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2008); “Mungiki defectors,” Gathungu
v. Holder, 725 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2013); “escapee Mexican child laborers,” Gonzalez Cano v.
Lynch, 809 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 2016); “Guatemalan repatriates who have lived and worked in
the United States for many years and are perceived to be wealthy,” Cinto-Velasquez v. Lynch, 817
F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2016); and “imputed wealthy Americans,” Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816
F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016).
121. Only a small number of cases are designated as precedent by the BIA. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(g)(3) (2020) (“By majority vote of the permanent Board members, selected decisions of
the Board rendered by a three-member panel or by the Board en banc may be designated to serve as
precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues.”). Similarly, “[t]he vast majority of
the Board’s decisions are unpublished.” DEP’T OF JUST., BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE
MANUAL 8 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1101411/download [https://perma.cc
/AZ3E-E8Z9].
122. 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662 (B.I.A. 1988).
123. 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990), adopted as precedent in all future proceedings,
Att’y Gen. Order No. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994).
124. 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 337 (B.I.A. 1996).
125. Id. at 342.

5_NANASI_45.2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/6/2021 12:12 PM

280

[Vol. 45:260

N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

Later that same year, the Board issued a decision in Matter of Kasinga, recognizing the particular social group of young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu
tribe of Northern Togo who did not undergo “female genital mutilation, as practiced by that tribe, and who opposed the practice.”126 Although the wordy PSG
appears on its face to be limited, and the specific facts of the case centered around
the practice of female genital mutilation/cutting, the case was groundbreaking in
its recognition of gender as a basis for asylum. Finally, in Matter of V-T-S-, the
Board found that Filipinos of “mixed Filipino-Chinese ancestry”—a group that
could arguably also fall under the nationality ground—are a viable particular social group.127
B. Particular Social Groups After the Addition of the Social Distinction and
Particularity Requirements
In contrast to the relatively generous acceptance of particular social groups in
the decade after the Acosta decision, in the 14 years since the Board of Immigration Appeals began instituting additional requirements for PSGs, it has only recognized two new groups—one providing protection to survivors of intimate partner violence and the other relating to family membership. Both have since been
overruled by Trump administration attorneys general.
1. Claims Based on Intimate Partner Violence
After Matter of Kasinga opened the door for the United States’ acceptance of
gender-based asylum claims, the path to recognition of domestic violence as a
ground for asylum was a long and winding one. The first significant intimate partner violence case to be adjudicated by the immigration court system was Matter
of R-A-.128 Ms. R-A- (whose full name is Rodi Alvarado) endured horrific violence at the hands of her husband, a former soldier in the Guatemalan army, from
the time she married him at age sixteen.129 In the face of increasing and neardeadly abuse, Ms. Alvarado fled to the United States and sought asylum. 130
A 14-year legal battle ensued. After the government appealed her original
asylum grant by the immigration judge, the BIA concluded that “Guatemalan
women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions,
who believe that women are to live under male domination,” did not constitute a

126. 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996).
127. 21 I. & N. Dec. 792, 798 (B.I.A. 1997).
128. 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (Att’y Gen. 2001),
remanded, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (Att’y Gen. 2005), stay lifted, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (Att’y Gen. 2008).
129. Id. at 909.
130. Id.
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PSG.131 Two attorneys general intervened in the case,132 and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)133 ultimately reversed its position, supporting a grant
of asylum for Ms. Alvarado based on the PSG “married women in Guatemala who
are unable to leave the relationship.”134 The brief filed by DHS in support of Ms.
Alvarado marked the first time that this “unable to leave” social group formulation, one that would become entrenched in domestic violence asylum claims in
years to come, was officially posited. Several years, remands, and attorneys general later, an immigration judge in San Francisco granted Ms. Alvarado asylum.135
Because the grant of asylum in Matter of R-A- was at the immigration judge,
or trial court, level, the lack of precedent meant that another domestic violence
asylum case was soon ripe for consideration. In Matter of L-R-, DHS originally
defended the IJ’s denial of Ms. L-R-’s claim before the BIA, but as the case progressed, the agency came to support Ms. L-R-’s request for asylum.136 In a brief
to the BIA, DHS posited two alternative groups that Ms. L-R-, and supporters of
intimate partner violence more generally, could advance—“Mexican women in
domestic relationships who are unable to leave” and “Mexican women who are
viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship”—
and explained how each met the immutability, visibility, and particularity requirements.137
After the parties filed supplemental briefings with BIA, DHS requested remand of Matter of L-R- to the immigration judge.138 DHS stipulated that Ms. L-Rwas eligible for asylum, and in August of 2010, she was granted asylum in a

131. Id. at 917.
132. Because the Board of Immigration Appeals is an administrative court housed within the
Department of Justice, the Attorney General has the authority to intervene in any case before the
BIA and issue decisions on that matter. See infra note 219.
133. Attorneys from the Department of Homeland Security—specifically, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor—represent the interests of the U.S.
government in immigration proceedings. See DHS, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor—Overview, https://www.ice.gov/opla [https://perma.cc/9QQX-66K5] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020).
134. Department of Homeland Security’s Position on Respondent’s Eligibility for Relief at
15, Matter of Alvarado-Pena, No. A 73 753 922 (Att’y Gen. Feb. 19, 2004), https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter%20of%20R-A-%20DHS%20brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY89XZKC].
135. Matter of Alvarado-Pena, [redacted] (Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev. Dec. 10, 2009) (on file
with author). The immigration judge’s decision was brief, reading simply, “Inasmuch as there is no
binding authority on the legal issues raised in this case, I conclude that I can conscientiously accept
what is essentially the agreement of the parties [to grant asylum].” Id.
136. Supplemental Brief for Department of Homeland Security, Matter of L-R-, [redacted]
(B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4
_13_2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ND5-CF9H].
137. Id. at 14–19.
138. Matter of L-R-, CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work
/matter-l-r [https://perma.cc/R6QU-J58T] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020).
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summary order, once again, a procedural history that left future survivors and domestic violence advocates without binding precedent upon which to rely.139
After decades of uncertainty and ambiguity during both the pendency and after the resolution of Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R-, the BIA issued a precedent
decision addressing the eligibility of survivors of domestic violence for asylum in
August of 2014. In Matter of A-R-C-G- the Board considered the case of a woman
from Guatemala, who, like Ms. Alvarado and Ms. L-R-, was subjected to brutal
abuse by her intimate partner.140 The BIA found, and DHS conceded, that the
abuse Ms. A-R-C-G- suffered was on account of her membership in the particular
social group of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.”141 Matter of A-R-C-G- was hailed as a landmark case, one which, after
decades of advocacy and litigation, finally established precedent for the right to
asylum for survivors of intimate partner violence.142

139. Much like the final order in Matter of R-A-, this decision is also extremely brief. The
order simply states that asylum is granted, with a notation that the grant was a result of “stipulation
of the parties.” Id. (quoting the summary order).
140. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389–90 (B.I.A. 2014).
141. Id. at 388–90.
142. Julia Preston, In First for Court, Woman is Ruled Eligible for Asylum in U.S. on Basis of
Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/30/us/victim-ofdomestic-violence-in-guatemala-is-ruled-eligible-for-asylum-in-us.html [https://perma.cc/3WJJBKVR]; Tatyana Delgado, Landmark Asylum Decision for Domestic Violence Victims, CATH. LEGAL
IMMIGR. NETWORK, https://cliniclegal.org/resources/articles-clinic/landmark-asylum-decision-domestic-violence-victims [https://perma.cc/9633-AEG7?type=image] (last visited Oct. 31, 2020);
Amy Grenier, Landmark Decision on Asylum Claims Recognizes Domestic Violence Victims,
IMMIGR. IMPACT (Sept. 2, 2014), http://immigrationimpact.com/2014/09/02/landmark-decision-onasylum-claims-recognizes-domestic-violence-victims/#.XV1hyy3MyfU [https://perma.cc/6T52-TC
QW].
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The relative certainty143 provided by Matter of A-R-C-G- was, however,
short-lived. In March 2018, then-AG Jeff Sessions referred to himself144 a domestic violence asylum case, Matter of A-B-, with the stated goal of seeking to answer
the question of “whether, and under what circumstances, being a victim of private
criminal activity constitutes a cognizable ‘particular social group’ for purposes of
an application for asylum or withholding of removal.”145 Three months later, Sessions used Matter of A-B- to overrule Matter of A-R-C-G- and generally cast doubt
on the viability of asylum claims based on intimate partner violence.146
In his opinion, Sessions makes the sweeping assertion that claims “pertaining
to domestic violence . . . perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify
for asylum.”147 His decision is based in part on his view that “married women in
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” lack social distinction as a
particular social group because “there is significant room for doubt that Guatemalan society views these women, as horrible as their personal circumstances may
be, as members of a distinct group in society, rather than each as a victim of a
particular abuser in highly individualized circumstances.”148
A full exploration of Matter of A-B- is outside the scope of this Article, but
scholars and others have critiqued Sessions’ antiquated views of intimate partner
violence as a “private matter;” the excessive dicta throughout the opinion; his understanding of nexus, or the requirement that persecution be inflicted “on account

143. Despite the significance of the precedent decision in A-R-C-G-, it was not a panacea.
Even after the decision, “arbitrary and inconsistent outcomes . . . continued to characterize asylum
adjudication in this area of the law.” Blaine Bookey, Gender-Based Asylum Post-Matter of
A-R-C-G-: Evolving Standards and Fair Application of the Law, 22 SW. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2016).
144. As discussed above, supra note 132, Attorneys General, as head of the Department of
Justice, which houses the Board of Immigration Appeals, have broad power to refer cases to themselves. See also infra note 219. However, the manner in which Matter of A-B- reached Sessions’
desk is a matter of some controversy. The case was originally heard by an immigration judge, who
denied Ms. A-B-’s claim. On appeal, the BIA reversed and remanded the case to the IJ for approval.
However, the IJ did not do as instructed, instead attempting to recertify the case to the Board. At
some point thereafter, the Attorney General learned of the decision (through unknown means) and
certified the case to himself. See NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., ASYLUM PRACTICE ADVISORY:
APPLYING FOR ASYLUM AFTER MATTER OF A-B- 7–8, https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/default
/files/content-type/resource/documents/2018-06/Matter%20of%20A-B-%20Practice%20Advisory
%20-%20Final%20-%206.21.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/333L-BMJM] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020).
The immigration judge, V. Stuart Couch, who presided over the original trial, denied the claims of
93.2% of applicants who appeared before his court, one of the highest denial rates in the country.
Judge V. Stuart Couch, TRAC IMMIGRATION, https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judgereports
/00394CHL/index.html [https://perma.cc/P3QC-NCCY] (last visited Sept. 11, 2020). After his actions relating to Matter of A-B-, IJ Couch was appointed by AG Barr to serve on the Board of Immigration Appeals. See Executive Office for Immigration Review Swears in Six New Board Members,
DOJ EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1197631
/download [https://perma.cc/K2EX-7GGE].
145. 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 227 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
146. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 317 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
147. Id. at 320.
148. Id. at 336.
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of” or “in order to overcome” a protected characteristic; and his creation of a
heightened, and ultra vires, standard for claims of persecution at the hands of nonstate actors.149 Despite these critiques, Matter of A-B- is now the precedent case
on intimate partner violence and asylum and the PSG recognized by Matter of AR-C-G- has been abrogated. Although asylum claims are still adjudicated on a
case-by-case basis150 and survivors of domestic violence continue to have a path
to lawful immigration status by positing PSGs that are immutable, socially distinct, and particular, the lack of precedent poses serious challenges.151 Moreover,
the reasoning utilized by then-Attorney General Sessions in Matter of A-B- was
soon cited and echoed by Attorney General Barr to overrule the only other postAcosta particular social group.
2. Claims Based on Family Membership
A particular social group based on family membership has an unparalleled
foundation in the BIA’s jurisprudence. Matter of Acosta listed “kinship ties” as
one of the prototypical characteristics of an immutable particular social group,152
and in Matter of H-, the Board, citing the link between clan and family ties, recognized clan membership as the basis for a PSG.153 In 2017, the Board decided
Matter of L-E-A-, which explicitly recognized a particular social group based on
immediate family.154
149. See, e.g., Natalie Nanasi, Commentary: Matter of A-B-, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS:
REWRITTEN FAMILY LAW OPINIONS 360 (Rachel Rebouche ed., 2020); Theresa A. Vogel, Critiquing
Matter of A-B-: An Uncertain Future in Asylum Proceedings for Women Fleeing Intimate Partner
Violence, 52 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 343, 373–406 (2019). Additionally, and significantly, eleven of
twelve amici and the Department of Homeland Security itself argued in briefings that A-R-C-Gshould not be vacated as it constituted a valid application of law. See Jeffrey S. Chase, The Immigration Court: Issues and Solutions, https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/3/28/i6el1do6l5
p443u1nkf8vwr28dv9qi [https://perma.cc/9C7G-QWHR] (last visited Aug. 27, 2020).
150. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (“The particular kind of
group characteristic that will qualify under this construction remains to be determined on a case-bycase basis.”); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 242, 251 (B.I.A. 2014) (noting that, since
“social group determinations are made on a case-by-case basis,” its “holdings in Matter of S-E-Gand Matter of E-A-G- should not be read as a blanket rejection of all factual scenarios involving
gangs”).
151. Although significant legal hurdles remain for those seeking asylum based on intimate
partner violence, a number of federal courts have questioned the analysis in Matter of A-B- and
rejected Sessions’ categorial rule precluding asylum based on domestic abuse. See, e.g., De PenaPaniagua v. Barr, 957 F.3d 88, 89 (1st Cir. 2020); Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778, 785 (6th Cir.
2020); Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 126–27 (D.D.C. 2018).
152. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
153. Matter of H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 342 (B.I.A. 1996). Family as a particular social group
also has a strong basis in international law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
states that “the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 23(1), Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force in the United States Sept. 8, 1992); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at art. 16(3), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 74 (Dec. 10, 1948).
154. 27 I. & N. Dec 40, 42 (B.I.A. 2017).
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The applicant in Matter of L-E-A- was the son of a Mexican grocer who refused to allow La Familia Michoacana, a criminal cartel, to sell drugs in his store.
A week after Mr. L-E-A- also rejected a similar demand, the cartel attempted to
kidnap him, leading him to flee to the United States.155 In analyzing Mr. L-E-A-’s
claim, the BIA, echoing the language of social distinction, first stated that “a claim
based on family membership will depend on the nature and degree of the relationships involved and how those relationships are regarded by the society in question.”156 It then concluded that in the instant case, it had “no difficulty identifying
the respondent, a son residing in his father’s home, as being a member of the particular social group comprised of his father’s immediate family.”157
Recognizing a PSG, however, is only one step in the asylum analysis. Applicants must also demonstrate that the persecution they suffered or fear is “on account of” their membership in that PSG, also known as the “nexus” requirement.158 In its discussion of nexus in Matter of L-E-A-, the Board stated that “the
fact that a persecutor targets a family member simply as a means to an end is not,
by itself, sufficient to establish a claim, especially if the end is not connected to
another protected ground.”159 It then concluded that Mr. L-E-A- did not meet this
new and heightened nexus standard because he “did not establish that his membership in a particular social group comprised of his father’s family members was
at least one central reason for the events he experienced and the harm he claims to
fear in the future.”160 In reaching this decision, the Board appeared to create a
separate requirement, a so-called “double nexus” requirement,161 applicable only
to family-based particular social groups—that an applicant must suffer persecution on account of a second protected ground in order to merit asylum protection.
Analyzing nexus in this way would mean that a family-based PSG is subject
to requirements that other groups—and other grounds—are not. This is, of course,
contrary to the statute, which makes no such distinction. Moreover, as federal
courts have unequivocally stated, “the law in this circuit and others is clear that a
family may be a particular social group simply by virtue of its kinship ties, without
requiring anything more.”162

155. See id. at 41.
156. Id. at 43.
157. Id.
158. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
159. 27 I. & N. Dec. at 45.
160. Id. at 47. In 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act, which requires applicants for
asylum to prove that a protected ground is “at least one central reason” for the fear of persecution.
REAL ID Act of 2005, Div. B of Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, 303 (2005). Accord Matter of
J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2007) (applying the “at least one central reason” language).
161. See Fatma Marouf, Becoming Unconventional: Constricting the ‘Particular Social
Group’ Ground for Asylum, 44 N.C. J. INT’L L. 487, 509 (2019).
162. Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2014).
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Concerns about nexus did not have much time to manifest in future cases,
however, because in December 2018, Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker
(who served in his position for a little over three months) referred Matter of L-E-Ato himself.163 The question posed in Whitaker’s order was “[w]hether, and under
what circumstances, an alien may establish persecution on account of membership
in a ‘particular social group’ . . . based on the alien’s membership in a family
unit.”164
In July 2019, Attorney General William Barr issued a decision that overruled
the part of Matter of L-E-A- that recognized family membership as a basis for a
particular social group.165 Barr’s order asserts that most families likely cannot
constitute a valid PSG because they are not sufficiently socially distinct.166 According to the Attorney General, only families with “greater meaning in society”
or with “societal importance” satisfy the element of social distinction.167 “The
average family,” he argues, would be “unlikely” to satisfy meet his new PSG criteria.168
Barr’s order also asserts that since “almost every alien is a member of a family
of some kind, categorically recognizing families as particular social groups would
render virtually every alien a member of a particular social group.”169 This statement echoes the reasoning of those who fear that a broad PSG definition would
open the floodgates of asylum seekers. The flaw in Barr’s argument becomes readily apparent by substituting the word “family” with “race” or “national origin.”170
In doing so, one can easily see that broad membership in an asylum ground should
not disqualify it from serving as a basis for protection under existing law.
The Attorney General’s opinion in Matter of L-E-A- also claims that if “Congress intended for refugee status to turn on one’s suffering of persecution ‘on account of’ family membership, Congress would have included family identity as
one of the expressly enumerated covered grounds for persecution.”171 This too is
a disingenuous argument and an unsound reason for rejecting an otherwise valid
PSG. Particular social group has long been “understood to constitute a dynamic
category, open to future developments.”172 Countless categories of individuals
163. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 494.
164. Id.
165. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581, 596–97 (Att’y Gen. 2019).
166. Id. at 582 (citing Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 217 (B.I.A. 2014)) (“[W]hat
qualifies certain clans or kinship groups as particular social groups is not merely the genetic ties
among the members. Rather, it is that those ties or other salient factors establish the kinship group,
on its own terms, as a ‘recognized component of the society in question.’”).
167. Id. at 594.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 593.
170. Every person has a race or a national origin, yet asylum law explicitly recognizes those
expansive categories as bases of protection. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018).
171. Id.
172. THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL:
A COMMENTARY 391 (Andreas Zimmerman, ed. 2011).
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were not explicitly mentioned in the refugee definition, but the statute has long
been interpreted in a way that protects unenumerated groups that fall under the
broad categories of the other asylum grounds (especially particular social
group).173
Barr’s order addresses, but ultimately dismisses, the firmly established legal
precedent recognizing families as viable PSGs.174 Since Acosta, family has been
described as the “quintessential particular social group”175 and courts have declared that “the family provides a prototypical example of a ‘particular social
group.’”176 Many federal circuit courts agree with the Seventh Circuit’s assessment that “case law has suggested, with some certainty, that a family constitutes
a cognizable ‘particular social group.’”177 Barr’s decision in Matter of L-E-A- was
thus a drastic break with not only sound precedent but the reasoned analysis of
nearly every court or jurist who has considered the issue.
It is important to note that Matter of A-B- and Matter of L-E-A- do not eliminate domestic violence or family-based asylum. When stripped of dicta, Sessions’

173. In fact, when the House of Representatives debated the 1980 Refugee Act, Representative Elizabeth Holtzman noted that the Act “does not specifically refer to any particular group, because this is legislation not for today or next year, but for many years to come.” 125 C ONG. REC.
35,813 (1979).
174. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 589 (“I recognize that a number of courts of appeals
have issued opinions that recognize a family-based social group as a ‘particular social group’ under
the asylum statute. . . . I also recognize that certain courts of appeals have conserved the requisite
elements of a ‘particular social group’ and, despite the requirements set forth in M-E-V-G- and
W-G-R-, have nonetheless suggested that shared family ties alone are sufficient to satisfy the INA’s
definition of ‘refugee.’”).
175. Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015).
176. Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 125 (4th Cir. 2011) (recognizing family
members of “those who actively oppose gangs in El Salvador by agreeing to be prosecutorial witnesses” as a PSG). The court further opined: “[W]e can conceive of few groups more readily identifiable than the family.” Id. See also Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986)
(finding that a group of family members was a “prototypical example” of a PSG).
177. Iliev v. INS, 127 F.3d 638, 642 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that “other circuits have found
that family is perhaps the most easily identifiable ‘particular social group’ that could serve as the
basis for persecution”). See also Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (“There can,
in fact, be no plainer example of a social group based on common identifiable and immutable characteristics than that of the nuclear family.”); Vumi v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 150, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“The Board has unambiguously held that membership in a nuclear family may substantiate a socialgroup basis of persecution.”); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1238–40 (3d Cir. 1993) (accepting that
“kinship ties” qualify as a particular social group); Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 235 (4th
Cir. 2004) (“We join our sister circuits in holding that ‘family’ constitutes a ‘particular social
group.’”); Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 995 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The first characteristic of
their proffered social group—membership in the same family—is widely recognized by the
caselaw.”).
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and Barr’s178 opinions rest only on their objection to the BIA accepting too many
stipulations from the parties, which led them to conclude that the court’s analysis
“lacked rigor and broke with [its] own precedents.”179 Eligibility for asylum is
still, as it has always been, determined on a case-by-case basis,180 which means
that judges remain free to recognize particular social groups based on intimate
partner violence and family membership even in the absence of BIA precedent.
However, with precedent-setting cases overruled, future decisions will lack predictability, uniformity, and consistency.181
The volatility of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ jurisprudence—the
changing PSG definition and the inconsistency of its application—led to the intervention of the federal courts. A discussion of federal circuit courts of appeals’
particular social group jurisprudence follows.
IV.
APPLICATION BY FEDERAL COURTS
Although the Board of Immigration Appeals is the highest administrative
body to interpret U.S. immigration laws, appeals of its decisions can be made to

178. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 596 (“[T]he Board’s particular social group analysis
merely cited past Board and federal court precedents recognizing family-based groups and then
agreed with the parties’ stipulations. The Board summarily concluded that ‘the facts of this case
present a valid particular social group,’ without explaining how the facts supported this finding or
satisfied the particularity and social visibility requirements. This cursory treatment could not, and
did not, satisfy the Board’s duty to ensure that the respondent satisfied the statutory requirements to
qualify for asylum.”). Barr’s arguments and concerns relating to stipulations are surprising, because
the family-based particular social group was firmly settled precedent, so such stipulations were routine and even expected. In fact, the rare consensus between immigration advocates and the Department of Homeland Security could arguably indicate the strength of the domestic violence and familybased particular social groups. The attacks are also disingenuous because the Trump administration
argued it sought to make the system “more efficient” when it imposed quotas on immigration judges.
Tal Kopan, Justice Department Rolls Out Case Quotas for Immigration Judges, CNN POLITICS (Apr.
2, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/02/politics/immigration-judges-quota/index.html [https://
perma.cc/JBR5-PNAT]. Were that truly the case, it seems illogical for Sessions and Barr to ignore
the role of stipulations in increasing judicial efficiency.
179. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 333 (A.G. 2018).
180. See supra note 150.
181. According to studies conducted by Professors Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew
Schoenholtz, and Philip Schrag, the asylum adjudicatory system is already beset with rampant inconsistency. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz & Philip Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 389 (2007). The authors describe “remarkable variation in decisions . . . even during periods when there has been no intervening change in the
law” based on non-substantive factors such as the national origin or current geographic location of
the applicant or the attitude and identity of the adjudicator. Id. at 302. See generally PHILLIP G.
SCHRAG, ANDREW SCHOENHOLTZ & JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES, LIVES IN THE BALANCE: ASYLUM
ADJUDICATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (2014).
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the federal court of appeals. A federal court’s decision is binding on the BIA when
it considers cases arising in that circuit.182
Every federal court of appeals in the United States has considered the Board’s
post-Acosta criteria. Many courts have accepted the social distinction and particularity tests,183 but several others have rejected the imposition of these additional
requirements. This section will review the decisions of the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals to highlight the varied approaches taken by federal courts.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected outright the social visibility and particularity requirements. In Gatimi v. Holder, the court found that social
visibility was inconsistent with past decisions, and thus not entitled to Chevron
deference.184 The principle of deference under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council will be discussed in detail in Section V.C. below, but in brief, it is a
doctrine that requires courts to defer to an agency’s (in this case, the Board of
Immigration Appeals’) reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.185
Judge Posner, who authored the Gatimi opinion, concluded that the Board’s
formula “makes no sense” and that the BIA had not “attempted, in this or any other
case, to explain the reasoning behind the criterion of social visibility.”186 In holding that the Board’s interpretation of particular social group was unreasonable, the
court highlighted concerns about the BIA’s lack of uniformity in decision-making,
stating that when “an administrative agency’s decisions are inconsistent, a court
cannot pick one of the inconsistent lines and defer to that one . . . [s]uch picking

182. See Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A federal agency is obligated
to follow circuit precedent in cases originating within that circuit.”) (citing NLRB v. Ashkenazy
Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 (1991)).
183. See Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that social visibility is not a departure from the Acosta standard, but rather an “elaboration of how the immutable
characteristic requirement operates”); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007)
(finding the social visibility requirement “consistent with this Court’s reasoning that a ‘particular
social group is comprised of individuals who possess some fundamental characteristic in common
which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor—or in the eyes of the outside world in
general’”) (quoting Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991)); Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d
440, 447 (4th Cir. 2011) (recognizing both social distinction and particularity as criteria for a valid
particular social group); Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding
additional PSG requirements as “a subtle shift that evolved out of the BIA’s prior decisions on similar cases”); Umama-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 669 (6th Cir. 2013) (upholding social distinction and particularity criteria); Costanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that
“a social group requires sufficient particularity and visibility such that the group is perceived as a
cohesive group by society”); Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222, 1230–35 (10th Cir. 2011)
(upholding and elaborating on the definitions of particularity and social visibility); Pinzon Pulido v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 427 F. App’x 729, 730 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating that “[i]n assessing whether the
alien’s alleged group constitutes a particular social group, we consider the group’s immutability and
social visibility”).
184. 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009).
185. See 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
186. Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615.
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and choosing would condone arbitrariness and usurp the agency’s responsibilities.”187
The Gatimi decision was issued before the Board redefined social visibility
as social distinction, and the court devoted significant attention to the illogical
nature of the visibility requirement. It noted the obvious—that those at risk of
persecution will often hide, and that “to the extent that the members of the target
group are successful in remaining invisible, they will not be ‘seen’ by other people
in the society as ‘a segment of the population.’”188
Even after the Board subsequently clarified that ocular visibility was not required and renamed social visibility as social distinction, the Seventh Circuit did
not reverse its position. In the 2018 case W.G.A. v. Sessions, the court noted that
“[w]hether the Board’s particularity and social distinction requirements are entitled to Chevron deference remains an open question in this circuit.”189 The court
also validated concerns that “social distinction and particularity create a conceptual trap that is difficult, if not impossible, to navigate” because “[t]he applicant
must identify a group that is broad enough that the society as a whole recognizes
it, but not so broad that it fails particularity.”190
Like the Seventh Circuit, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals initially rejected
the BIA’s imposition of the visibility and particularity requirements. However, in
2018, the Third Circuit reversed its position and now accepts the Board’s formulation.191
The Third Circuit’s initial precedent arose in the case of Valdiviezo-Galdamez
v. United States Attorney General, in which it considered the particular social
group of “Honduran youth who have been actively recruited by gangs but have
refused to join because they oppose the gangs.”192 The court concluded that because the BIA had departed from Acosta without a principled explanation, the visibility and particularity requirements were not entitled to Chevron deference.193
The court based its decision on its view that the Board’s actions were both inconsistent and irrational.194 Understanding social visibility to impermissibly mandate
on-sight visibility, the court determined that the new requirement was “inconsistent with past BIA decisions . . . [and therefore] an unreasonable addition” to

187. Id. at 616.
188. Id. at 615.
189. 900 F.3d 957, 964 (7th Cir. 2018). See also Orellana-Arias v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 476,
484 (7th Cir. 2017) (reviewing the Board’s factual determinations for substantial evidentiary support
and its legal conclusions de novo).
190. W.G.A., 900 F.3d. at 965 n.4.
191. See S.E.R.L. v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 547 (3d Cir. 2018).
192. 663 F.3d 582, 617 (3d Cir. 2011).
193. Id. at 608–9.
194. Id. at 604 (“Although we afforded the BIA’s interpretation of ‘particular social
group’ Chevron deference in Fatin, this did not give the agency license to thereafter adjudicate
claims of social group status inconsistently, or irrationally.”).
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the PSG requirements.195 The court also took issue with social visibility’s inconsistent application, finding that the Board sometimes described visibility as recognizability by others in society but at other times in reference to internal characteristics, such as sexual orientation, that are invisible absent self-disclosure.196
Finally, irreconcilability lay at the root of the Valdiviezo-Galdamez court’s
explicit rejection of the particularity requirement. As it stated, social visibility and
particularity “appear to be different articulations of the same concept” with the
latter being “little more than a reworked definition [of the former].”197 Thus, because it was “hard-pressed to discern any difference between the requirement of
‘particularity’ and the discredited requirement of ‘social visibility,’” the Third Circuit declined to support the Board’s definition of particular social group.198
However, after the BIA’s decisions in Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of
W-G-R- reclassified social visibility as social distinction, the Third Circuit reversed course. In S.E.R.L. v. United States Attorney General, the court stated that
the BIA had responded to the concerns expressed in Valdiviezo-Galdamez by
providing a “‘principled reason’ and explanation” for the new requirements and
distinguishing between particularity and visibility/distinction.199 As such, the appeals court found that the BIA’s new “statutory interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference.”200
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals takes a wholly different approach.
In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, the court stated that a particular social group “implies
a collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some
common impulse or interest.”201 The court further explained that “[o]f central concern is the existence of a voluntary associational relationship among the purported
members, which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to their
identity as a member of that discrete social group.”202 Later, in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, the court clarified that this “voluntary associational relationship” test
is an alternative to the Acosta immutability definition.203
After Hernandez-Montiel, the court further elaborated on its PSG standard by
addressing the BIA’s jurisprudence. In Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit found that social visibility was a “refinement” of Acosta and required

195. Id.
196. Id. at 603–04.
197. Id. at 608.
198. Id.
199. 894 F.3d 535, 547 (3d Cir. 2018).
200. Id. at 540. Despite its acceptance of the BIA’s PSG definition, the court also acknowledged “arguable inconsistencies in the [BIA’s] precedent” that pose a risk of the requirements being
“applied arbitrarily and interpreted to impose an unreasonably high evidentiary burden.” Id. at 550.
201. 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
202. Id.
203. 225 F.3d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000).
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“perception” as opposed to on-sight visibility.204 As such, because the visibility
(and particularity) requirements could be applied in such a way as to avoid direct
conflict with prior precedent, the court did not reject outright the new criteria as
unreasonable under its Chevron analysis.205 However, the court left the matter
unresolved, concluding that it “need not decide, in this case, at this time, whether
[it] should align [itself] with the Third and Seventh Circuits and invalidate these
requirements.”206
In sum, federal courts have had varied responses to the BIA’s imposition of
the social visibility/distinction and particularity requirements on top of Acosta’s
immutability test. Some courts have accepted the new requirements, some have
rejected them entirely, and others have adopted different standards and definitions.
What remains is a circuit split and continuing critiques of the BIA’s PSG jurisprudence, particularly in light of the Trump administration’s elimination of the only
two particular social groups recognized by the BIA after new criteria were introduced in 2006. The next Section proposes recommendations that could resuscitate
the now-dead PSG ground.
V.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The stated goal of the 1980 Refugee Act was “to provide a permanent and
systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States.”207 The Act’s language suggests a desire
for consistency and fairness in the adjudication of claims for asylum, regardless
of shifting political winds.
Notably, nearly all of the cases that imposed extra conditions on the particular
social group definition accepted by the international community and originally
adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals involved applicants facing persecution at the hands of Central American gangs. As Professor Susan Bibler Courtin
has noted, the United States government has long treated Central Americans “as
generally undeserving of political asylum,” regardless of the legal merits of their

204. 707 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). The court stated: “‘[O]n-sight’ visibility
would be inconsistent with previous BIA decisions and likely impermissible under the statute. However, we do not read C-A- and subsequent cases to require ‘on-sight’ visibility.” Id. at 1087–88.
205. Id. at 1089 (“So long as the ‘social visibility’ and ‘particularity’ criteria area are applied
in a way that did not directly conflict with prior agency precedent, we would be hard-pressed to
reject the new criteria as unreasonable under Chevron.”).
206. Id. at 1091. In Reyes v. Lynch, the court held that the BIA’s particularity and social distinction requirements were entitled to Chevron deference. See 842 F.3d 1125, 1133–37 (9th Cir.
2016).
207. Refugee Act of 1980 § 101(a), Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).

5_NANASI_45.2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

DEATH OF THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP

9/6/2021 12:12 PM

293

claims.208 This politicization of asylum was exacerbated in the Trump era, as
“[r]efugees of the Northern Triangle . . . face[d], in many courts, something of a
Sisyphean struggle to obtain asylum with denial rates for these cases remaining
far higher than for other countries.”209
Discrimination and animus against asylum seekers from Central America are
evident in PSG jurisprudence. As Professor Helen Grant has explained, “[i]n the
twenty-first century, it is former gang members, youth vulnerable to recruitment
by gangs . . . females subject to forced sexual relationships with gang members,
and informants on drug cartels and organized crime that form a sample of the
groups now seeking protection under the PSG ground.”210 These applicants do not
look like the political dissidents and survivors of race and religious-based persecution who were originally envisioned by the drafters of international and domestic asylum law. They also evoke floodgates and modern domestic political concerns. Yet although these asylum seekers face as serious and deadly risks as their
forbearers, U.S. courts have methodically curtailed particular social group eligibility to exclude them.211
While the BIA systematically denied claims of asylum seekers fleeing gang
violence in the 2000s, claims based on intimate partner violence and family membership were ultimately approved, perhaps because they seemed “safer” or more

208. See Susan Bibler Coutin, Falling Outside: Excavating the History of Central American
Asylum Seekers, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 569, 570 (2011). Echoing the current Justice Department’s
view of intimate partner violence as a personal matter, Professor Coutin explains that the change in
law and policy regarding Central American asylum seekers resulted in part from the United States’
shifting view of “the character of violence” in the region “from overtly political to seemingly criminal in nature.” Id. at 570.
209. Sarah Sherman-Stokes, Reparations for Central American Refugees, 96 DENV. L. REV.
585, 608 (2019). Professor Sherman-Stokes explains the rationale behind the low grant rates for
Central American asylum seekers by noting that “[e]arly on, it was clear what law enforcement,
Congress, political leaders, courts, and adjudicators thought of these Central Americans: that they
were undeserving economic migrants whose admission would open the ‘floodgates’ for the world’s
most poor and vulnerable to come pouring into the United States.” Id. at 593.
210. See Grant, supra note 93, at 899.
211. The dangerous conditions in the Northern Triangle have been well documented. See, e.g.,
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, WOMEN ON THE RUN: FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS OF
REFUGEES FLEEING EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, AND MEXICO (2015), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/operations/5630f24c6/women-run.html [https://perma.cc/B7XR-KRV3];
MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, Forced to Flee Central America’s Northern Triangle: A Neglected
Humanitarian Crisis (May 2017), http://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/msf_forced-to-flee-central-americas-northern-triangle_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8XW-6YUK]; Ben Raderstorf, Carole J.
Wilson, Elizabeth J. Zechmeister & Michael J. Camilleri, Beneath the Violence: How Insecurity
Shapes Daily Life and Emigration in Central America: A Report of the Latin American Public Opinion Project and the Inter-American Dialogue (The Dialogue, Working Paper, Oct. 2017),
https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Crime-Avoidance-Report-FINALONLINE.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8PD-4UD8].
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politically palatable for the BIA and DOJ. 212 But in an administration that was
hostile to asylum seekers and attempted, in countless ways,213 to curtail rights of
those who seek refuge in the United States, even these more sympathetic applicants were denied.
A review of PSG jurisprudence suggests that what truly underlies the actions
of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Department of Justice is politics. As
such, the way to depoliticize asylum, and return to the balanced and rights-protective system the drafters of both international and domestic law intended, is to legislate a PSG definition, address the overuse of attorney general certification, and
reconsider the application of the Chevron doctrine. This Section will address each
in turn.
A. Enact Legislation to Codify the Acosta Standard
In imposing the social distinction and particularity requirements, the Board
of Immigration Appeals has effectively stripped the particular social group ground
of all efficacy. Thus, in order to restore the law’s intent, Congress should amend
the refugee definition in the Immigration and Nationality Act and codify the
Acosta immutability standard alone as the definition of particular social group.
Alternatively, Congress could adopt a PSG definition modeled on the UNHCR
Guidelines—one in which social distinction is an alternative, used only when a
group does not possess the requisite immutability.214 In this way, the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ desire for particular social groups to be perceived as such
by society would be achieved without compromising protections for survivors.
A return to the Acosta test would not constitute a dramatic shift in PSG jurisprudence. Despite the BIA’s imposition of additional criteria between 2006 and
2014, the 1980s-era Acosta immutability standard continues to be a core part of
the particular social group definition.215 Requirements have been added, but
Acosta remains, which suggests its strength and its critical place in PSG jurisprudence.
Moreover, an Acosta-centered definition best comports with the intentions of
the drafters of 1951 Refugee Convention (and the 1967 Protocol that incorporated
the Convention by reference), international jurisprudence that has developed to

212. See generally Diane Uchimiya, Falling Through the Cracks: Gang Victims as Casualties
in Current Asylum Jurisprudence, 23 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 109 (2013); Lisa Frydman & Neha
Desai, Beacon of Hope or Failure of Protection? U.S. Treatment of Asylum Claims Based on Persecution by Organized Gangs, 12–10 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (“The often cursory denials of asylum
claims based on resistance to gangs seem to be largely a function of fear of floodgates, misunderstanding of precedent, or ignorance of conditions on the ground.”).
213. See supra notes 1–15 and accompanying text.
214. UNHCR PSG Guidelines, supra note 40, at 4.
215. See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 919 (B.I.A. 1999) (“The starting point for ‘social
group’ analysis remains the existence of an immutable or fundamental individual characteristic in
accordance with Matter of Acosta.”).
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implement it, and UNHCR guidance.216 And because, as described above, the goal
of the 1980 Refugee Act was to align domestic law with the Convention and Protocol, a definition emphasizing immutable characteristics also respects the intent
of Congress.
Since 2009, Congress has advanced a number of bills defining “particular social group” as “any group whose members share a characteristic that is either immutable or fundamental to identity, conscience, or the exercise of the person’s
human rights such that the person should not be required to change it, shall be
deemed a particular social group, without any additional requirement.”217 These
bills containing Acosta-only language have not gained sufficient traction in the
legislature, and in today’s divisive political climate, may be difficult to pass. As
such, until such time as legislation is practicable, regulatory reform may provide
an easier path.218
B. Create Article I Immigration Courts to Address the Politicization of
Immigration Adjudication
As described above, the two particular social groups recognized after the BIA
added social distinction and particularity requirements onto the Acosta test were
both overruled by Trump-appointed attorneys general. A single individual has the
power to overturn an appellate tribunal’s decision because immigration courts are
administrative bodies located within the Department of Justice. As such, AGs have
the authority to review, and overrule, decisions issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals.219

216. See Marouf, supra note 44, at 54–57 (detailing the use of the Acosta standard in foreign
courts).
217. Refugee Protection Act of 2010, S. 3113, 111th Cong. (2010); Refugee Protection Act
of 2011, S. 1202, 112th Cong. (2011); Refugee Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 2185, 112th Cong.
(2011); Violence Against Immigrant Women Act of 2012, H.R. 5331, 112th Cong. (2012); Violence
Against Immigrant Women Act of 2013, H.R. 629, 113th Cong. (2013); Refugee Protection Act of
2013, S. 645, 113th Cong. (2013); Refugee Protection Act of 2013, H.R. 1365, 113th Cong. (2013);
Refugee Protection Act of 2016, S. 3241, 114th Cong. (2016); Refugee Protection Act of 2016, H.R.
5851, 114th Cong. (2016).
218. See Jessica Marsden, Domestic Violence Asylum After Matter of L-R-, 123 YALE L.J.
2512, 2539–44 (2014) (positing that regulatory reform would be easier and more effective than
amending the INA).
219. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(ii) (2020) (“The Board shall refer to the Attorney General
for review of its decision all cases that . . . [t]he Attorney General directs the Board to refer to
him.”). For a detailed examination of the attorney general certification process, see Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841 (2016). Responses to Gonzales and Glen’s article
also provide thoughtful analysis of this broad power. See, e.g., David A. Martin, Improving the Exercise of the Attorney General’s Immigration Referral Power: Lessons from the Battle over the
“Categorical Approach” to Classifying Crimes, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2016); Bijal Shah, The
Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration Power, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 129 (2017); Margaret
H. Taylor, Midnight Agency Administration: Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 18 (2016).
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The power of case certification has been used with significantly increasing
frequency in recent years. Trump’s attorneys general certified 16 cases to themselves, which is more than triple the number of cases certified in the Obama and
Clinton administrations combined.220 Attorney General William Barr, who issued
the opinion in Matter of L-E-A-, did not certify any cases to himself when he was
the AG from 1991–1993 in the George H. W. Bush administration.221
In 2018, the Department of Justice took steps to further expand the circumstances in which attorneys general can refer cases to themselves for review. A
proposed rule would give the AG power to hear cases pending before (as opposed
to decided by) the BIA, as well as certain decisions by immigration judges that
have not been appealed to the BIA.222
The attorney general’s certification authority allows the politically appointed
head of an executive department to singlehandedly override the opinions of
judges. This is not, however, the only example of partisan interference in the immigration courts. For example, in 2002, former Attorney General John Ashcroft
cut the BIA’s membership “by more than half, removing four of the five members
who ruled in favor of noncitizens at the highest rates.”223 In a strikingly similar
move, in June 2020, nine members of the 23-member Board were reassigned,
which critics argued was a mechanism to dilute “the independence of an important
appeals body by filling it with new hires more willing to carry out the Trump administration’s restrictive immigration policies.”224 The executive branch also
houses both the prosecutors and the judges in the immigration court system,

220. Comprehensive List of AG-Certified Opinions in Trump Administration to Date,
IMMIGRATIONPROFBLOG (Nov. 9, 2020), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2020/11
/comprehensive-list-of-ag-certified-opinions-in-trump-administration-to-date.html [https://perma
.cc/9VNF-4K2Y]. See also Lorelei Laird, Whose Court is this Anyway? Immigration Judges Accuse
Executive Branch of Politicizing Their Courts, A.B.A. J., APRIL 2019, at 56, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/immigration-judges-executive-politicizing-courts [https://perma.cc/3X
CV-X4H6]. President Clinton’s Attorney General, Janet Reno, certified only one case to herself;
President Obama’s Attorneys General, Eric Holder and Loretta Lynch, certified a combined four. Id.
221. Id.
222. OFF. OF INFO. & REGUL. AFFS., OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT,
RIN 1125-AA86, REFERRAL OF DECISIONS IN IMMIGRATION MATTERS TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, (2018), https://reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201804&RIN=1125AA86 [https://perma.cc/22EB-8X3Z].
223. Amit Jain, Bureaucrats in Robes: Immigration “Judges” and the Trappings of “Courts,”
33 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 261, 272 (2019).
224. Tanvi Misra, DOJ ‘Reassigned’ Career Members of Board of Immigration Appeals,
ROLL CALL (June 9, 2020, 4:55 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/06/09/DOJ-REASSIGNEDCAREER-MEMBERS-OF-BOARD-OF-IMMIGRATION-APPEALS/ [https://perma.cc/DV6FGGH6].
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creating, at bare minimum, the appearance of conflict and collusion.225 Concerns
about fairness in the immigration court system generally, and the asylum adjudicatory process more specifically, were exacerbated in the Trump era, when “the
President, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security . . . applied extraordinary pressure on IJs and [Asylum Officers] to deny both applications for asylum and requests for asylum hearings, with predictable results.”226 In
these and many other ways, justice in immigration court is politicized and the independence of judges undermined.
Establishing an immigration court system that is independent from the Department of Justice could solve the problem of politicization of immigration justice. Many have called on Congress to establish the immigration courts as federal
Article I courts, unaffiliated with the Department of Justice.227 Precedent exists
for such a move, as other specialized courts, including the Court of Veteran’s Appeals, the Court of Federal Claims, and the U.S. Tax Court, function as Article I
courts.228 Such systems provide independence, transparency, and impartial justice
for all who appear before them, characteristics now lacking in our nation’s immigration courts.
C. Reconsider Chevron Deference
As discussed above in Section IV, the federal courts’ dominant jurisprudential
lens for evaluating the BIA’s particular social group decision-making is whether
the administrative court’s opinions should be entitled to deference under Chevron
v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel. The Chevron doctrine states that courts
should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.229 This
225. AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, AILA Policy Brief: Restoring Integrity
and Independence to America’s Immigration Courts (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.aila.org/File
/DownloadEmbeddedFile/77605 (noting “a conflict of interest built into the [U.S. immigration court]
system itself” because “[t]he Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which manages the
Immigration Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), is currently housed under DOJ.
While trial-level immigration prosecutors are housed under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) within Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Attorney General supervises
the Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) which defends immigration cases on behalf of the government in the circuit courts of appeals.”).
226. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Due Process, Immigration Judges, and Immigration Officers,
YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (July 24, 2019), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/due-process-immigration-judges-and-immigration-officers-by-richard-j-pierce-jr/ [https://perma.cc/JM9V-8P2C].
227. See, e.g., Letter from the American Bar Association, American Immigration Lawyers
Association, Federal Bar Association, and National Association of Immigration Judges, Congress
Should Establish an Independent Immigration Court (July 11, 2018) (on file with author) (arguing
that “in its current state, the immigration court system requires a structural overhaul to solve its
foundational problems”). An Article I court is a federal court organized under Article I of the United
States Constitution, which confers upon Congress the power “[t]o constitute tribunals inferior to the
Supreme Court.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
228. See David A. Case, Article I Courts, Substantive Rights, and Remedies for Government
Misconduct, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 101, 145 (2005).
229. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
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Section will address Chevron’s applicability in cases involving immigration law,
examine the waning strength of the Chevron doctrine, and explain why the BIA’s
PSG definition should not be entitled to deference.
1. Chevron and Its Applicability in Immigration Cases
Chevron analysis is applicable to the decisions of the Board of Immigration
Appeals because although the attorney general is the final interpreter of immigration laws,230 the AG has delegated this power to the Board.231 Several exceptions
to the applicability of Chevron deference to the Board exist, however. Deference
is only accorded to published BIA decisions232 and cases decided by a three-member panel of the Board.233 A federal court also does not have to defer to the BIA
if “neither the IJ’s nor BIA’s decision contains any analysis with persuasive
power.”234
The process for judicial review of agency decision-making under Chevron
involves two steps, which are discussed in turn below.235 Step One requires a court
to decide whether Congress has spoken to the question at issue. To determine this,
a court looks at whether Congress’ intent is “clear” and “unambiguously expressed.”236 If the court determines, using traditional tools of statutory

230. The INA provides that “determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect
to all questions of law shall be controlling.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2018).
231. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (“The Attorney General, while
retaining ultimate authority, has vested the BIA with power to exercise the ‘discretion and authority
conferred upon the Attorney General by law’ in the course of considering and determining cases
before it.”); Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2006) (“It is well-established that Congress delegated to the BIA the authority to promulgate rules, on behalf of the Attorney
General, that carry the force of law ‘through a process of case-by-case adjudication.’” (quoting
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425)).
232. Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e have held that
the Board’s precedential orders, which bind third parties, qualify for Chevron deference because
they are made with a ‘lawmaking pretense.’ We have not accorded Chevron deference to the Board’s
unpublished decisions, however, because they do not bind future parties.” (citations omitted)).
233. Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1012–13 (holding that a case must be decided by a threemember panel if it presents “[t]he need to establish a precedent construing the meaning of laws,
regulations, or procedures”) (alteration in original). Only a small number of cases are decided by a
three-member panel; panel decision are reserved for times when the BIA is required “to settle inconsistencies among the rulings of different immigration judges,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6)(i) (2020); “to
establish a precedent,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6)(ii) (2020); “to resolve a case or controversy of major
national import,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6)(iv) (2020); or “to resolve a complex, novel, unusual, or
recurring issue of law or fact,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6)(vii) (2020). More often, a single Board member will “affirm the decision of . . . the immigration judge, without opinion. . . .” 8 C.F.R. §
1003.1(e)(4)(i) (2020).
234. Mendis v. Filip, 554 F.3d 335, 338 n.3 (2d Cir. 2009).
235. Professor Cass Sunstein, among others, has argued that Chevron also has a “Step Zero,”
wherein federal courts should determine whether Chevron is applicable. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006).
236. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
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construction, that Congress expressed its intent, that intent must control.237 If,
however, the court determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous, it can infer
that Congress intended to vest definitional authority in the agency that regularly
administers in that area of law. The court then moves to Step Two of the Chevron
analysis.
The goal of Step Two is to decide whether the agency’s approach is “based
on a permissible construction of the statute.”238 The Court has generally defined
“permissible” as either “reasonable”239 or not “arbitrary or capricious.”240 In making its Step Two determination, a court can review the text, structure, and purpose
of the statute.241 But if, after doing so, a court finds that the agency did not “provide a reasoned explanation for its action”242 or that the outcome is unreasonable,
it fails at Step Two and its action cannot stand.
2. The Waning Strength of the Chevron Doctrine
Although Chevron is a pillar of administrative law jurisprudence,243 scholars
argue that its “importance is fading,”244 noting that in “recent years, we have seen
a growing call from the federal bench, on the Hill, and within the legal academy
to rethink administrative law’s deference doctrines to federal agency interpretations of law.”245 A full review of the critiques of Chevron is outside the scope of
237. The Chevron Court stated that courts “must reject administrative constructions that are
contrary to clear congressional intent.” Id. at 843 n.9.
238. Id. at 843.
239. See, e.g., id. at 845; Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106, 121 (2002).
240. The reasonableness analysis of Chevron Step Two is similar to the “arbitrary and capricious” standard in the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2018). See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 621 (2009)
(“Courts and commentators have converged on an emerging consensus that the ‘arbitrary, capricious,
and abuse of discretion’ standard set forth in Section 706(2)(A) supplies the metric for judicial oversight at Chevron’s second step.”). See also Nat’l Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 1000 (2005) (finding that an “arbitrary or capricious” deviation from previous agency
policy was impermissible under a Chevron analysis); Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011)
(noting that the arbitrary and capricious standard used in Step 2 of the Chevron analysis was the
same as arbitrary and capricious review under the Administrative Procedures Act).
241. See, e.g., Troy Corp. v. Browder, 120 F.3d 277, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (requiring an
agency’s interpretation to “be reasonable and consistent with the statutory purpose”).
242. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 45. The Court in Judulang further expounded that the bar is
“not . . . high . . . but it is an unwavering one.” Id.
243. Chevron is often described as the most cited decision in administrative law. See Jack M.
Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court: Still Failing After All These Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
731, 731 (2014) (stating that Chevron is the most cited Supreme Court administrative law decision);
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823 (2006) (labeling Chevron the most cited case in “modern public law”).
244. Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence,
59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 726–27 (2007).
245. Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 104 (2018).
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this Article, but briefly, its legitimacy has been questioned on grounds that include
concerns about separation of powers and a view that the doctrine vests too much
power and authority in both the executive branch and the federal government as a
whole.246
A majority of the justices currently sitting on the Supreme Court have criticized or call the Chevron doctrine into question. Justice Thomas authored a concurring opinion in Michigan v. EPA, writing separately solely to “note that [the
EPA’s] request for deference raises serious questions about the constitutionality
of our broader practice of deferring to agency interpretations of federal statutes.”247 Thomas argued that Chevron was a threat to separation of powers, as it
vested too much authority in the executive branch and precluded judges from exercising independent judgment.
A few years earlier, Chief Justice Roberts authored a dissent joined by Justice
Alito, in which he warned that “the danger posed by the growing power of the
administrative state cannot be dismissed.”248 Justice Alito also questioned the judiciary’s deference to agency interpretations of regulations in the 2015 case, Perez
v. Mortgage Bankers Association.249
Chevron critiques have also arisen in the Court’s examination of immigration
law. In Pereira v. Sessions, a case in which the Court considered the validity of a
notice to appear in immigration court that does not designate a specific time or
place for the removal proceeding, Justice Kennedy drafted a concurrence, writing
separately “to note [his] concern with the way in which the Court’s opinion in
[Chevron] has come to be understood and applied.”250 He critiqued the Fourth
Circuit’s decision-making process in another immigration case, Urbina v. Holder,
arguing that the court’s limited “analysis suggests an abdication of the Judiciary’s

246. Professor Christopher Walker recently published a detailed overview of Chevron critiques. See id. See also Emily Hammond, Elizabeth Garrett & M. Elizabeth Magill, Judicial Review
of Statutory Issues Under the Chevron Doctrine, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF
FEDERAL AGENCIES 67 (2015).
247. 576 U.S. 743, 760 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
248. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
249. 575 U.S. 92 (2015). Justice Alito’s concurring opinion addressed the Paralyzed Veterans
doctrine, which required federal agencies to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking when they
substantially altered an “interpretive” rule. See generally Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena
L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997). He speculated that the “creation of that doctrine may have been
prompted by an understandable concern about the aggrandizement of the power of administrative
agencies as a result of the combined effect of (1) the effective delegation to agencies by Congress of
huge swaths of lawmaking authority, . . . and (3) this Court’s cases holding that courts must ordinarily defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations.” 575 U.S. at 107–08 (Alito,
J., concurring).
250. 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Alito also used the Pereira case as an opportunity to express his view that Chevron is an “increasingly maligned precedent.” Id. at 2121 (Alito, J., dissenting).

5_NANASI_45.2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

DEATH OF THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP

9/6/2021 12:12 PM

301

proper role in interpreting federal statutes.”251 Kennedy concluded that he found
“the type of reflexive deference exhibited in some of these cases . . . troubling.”252
Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s replacement, Justice Kavanaugh, “indicated
skepticism of the [Chevron] doctrine in both academic and judicial writings” prior
to his confirmation to the Supreme Court.253 In a 2016 Harvard Law Review article, he argued that the Chevron framework should not apply when “an agency is
. . . interpreting a specific statutory term or phrase.”254 In a dissent in United States
Telecom Association v. FCC, then-Judge Kavanaugh argued that “for an agency
to issue a major rule, Congress must clearly authorize the agency to do so.”255
Thus, if his past writings are any indication, Justice Kavanaugh may, like his predecessor, join his colleagues in seeking to limit the Court’s deference to administrative agency decisions.
Like Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Gorsuch also expressed skepticism about the
Chevron doctrine prior to his appointment to the Court. In Gutierrez-Brizuela v.
Lynch, then-Judge Gorsuch raised separation-of-powers as well as other concerns,
noting that “[t]ransferring the job of saying what the law is from the judiciary to
the executive unsurprisingly invites the very sort of due process (fair notice) and
equal protection concerns the framers knew would arise if the political branches
intruded on judicial functions.”256 He added that both “Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little
difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.”257 Thus, given
his prior decisions, Justice Gorsuch would likely vote to limit Chevron’s reach in
any case that came before the Supreme Court.258

251.
252.
253.

Id. at 2120.
Id.
CONG. RES. SERV., DEFERENCE AND ITS DISCONTENTS: WILL THE SUPREME COURT
OVERRULE CHEVRON? 3 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10204.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7J6DCNF]. See also Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Christopher J. Walker, Judge Kavanaugh,
Chevron Deference, and the Supreme Court, REGUL. REV. (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/09/03/barnett-boyd-walker-kavanaugh-chevron-deference-supreme-court/
[https://perma.cc/MP5F-DTYK] (reviewing decisions authored by then-Judge Kavanaugh in an effort to predict how he might review federal agency statutory interpretations that come before him on
the Court).
254. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2154
(2016) (book review).
255. 855 F.3d 381, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
256. 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
257. Id. at 1149.
258. See Trevor W. Ezell & Lloyd Marshall, If Goliath Falls: Judge Gorsuch and the Administrative State, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 171, 175–76 (2017) (discussing then-Judge Gorsuch’s antiChevron views).
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Finally, although Justice Amy Coney Barrett does not have an extensive record on administrative law matters,259 she too may be inclined to limit Chevron
deference. Experts who have studied Barrett’s record and writings believe that her
commitment to textualism and her expressed willingness to overrule precedential
cases may make her open to revisiting the doctrine.260
In sum, one might assume that the increasingly conservative Supreme Court
would be reluctant to expand protections to immigrants. However, if the Court
does intervene to resolve the circuit split regarding the definition of particular social group, support for a return to the Acosta standard may come from the Court’s
desire to uphold its preferred values in the area of administrative law.261
3. The BIA’s Definition of “Particular Social Group” Does Not Merit
Chevron Deference
Whether the Supreme Court or federal courts of appeals should afford Chevron deference to the definition of particular social group promulgated by the Board
of Immigration Appeals is, of course, more than just a matter of who sits on those
courts. A closer analysis of Chevron and the BIA’s jurisprudence reveals that the
Board’s interpretation of the phrase “particular social group” fails at Chevron Step
Two.262
The Board of Immigration Appeals’ PSG definition is unreasonable for two
distinct reasons: (i) it is not in keeping with Congress’ intent for the Refugee Act
to comport with international law and obligations; and (ii) the Board’s actions
have defined the PSG out of existence, which cannot be a reasonable outcome. As
such, deference to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ interpretation is no longer
appropriate.

259. Evan Bernick, Judge Amy Coney Barrett on Statutory Interpretation: Textualism, Precedent, Judicial Restraint, and the Future of Chevron, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (July 3,
2018), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/judge-amy-coney-barrett-on-statutory-interpretation-textualism-precedent-judicial-restraint-and-the-future-of-chevron-by-evan-bernick/ [https://perma.cc/4N
ME-N5NE] (noting that “then-Professor Barrett didn’t write much about administrative law while
at Notre Dame Law School” and that Barrett did not write any opinions “in any major administrative
law case” during her tenure on the Seventh Circuit).
260. Id. See also Jeff Overley, Chevron Deference’s Future in Doubt if Barrett is Confirmed,
LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1318381/chevron-deference-s-future-indoubt-if-barrett-is-confirmed; James Goodwin, Will Confirming Judge Barrett be the Death of
Chevron Deference?, UNION OF CONCERNED SCI. BLOG (Oct. 15, 2020, 2:21 PM),
https://blog.ucsusa.org/guest-commentary/will-confirming-judge-barrett-be-the-death-of-chevrondeference [https://perma.cc/RA8Z-ZMTD].
261. Some have expressed concern about this “circuit conflict on an issue where national uniformity is vital.” Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting).
262. The BIA’s interpretation of PSG likely satisfies Chevron Step One because Congress did
not explicitly express its intent regarding the definition of particular social group when enacting the
Refugee Act of 1980, nor is the term defined in the statute or in the implementing regulations. See
supra Section II.B.
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The BIA’s Definition of “Particular Social Group” Is Inconsistent with Congressional Intent

There exists no single definition for what constitutes a “reasonable” agency
interpretation under Chevron Step Two, but scholars have suggested that “by ‘reasonable,’ the Court seemed to mean reasonable in light of the text, history, and
interpretative conventions that govern the interpretation of a statute by a court.”263
The Supreme Court itself has explained that “reasonable statutory interpretation
must account for both ‘the specific context in which . . . language is used’ and ‘the
broader context of the statute as a whole.’”264 Similarly, the Supreme Court has
held that Chevron deference does not apply to an agency interpretation that is not
“rationally related to the goals of the statute.”265
Although legislative history regarding the PSG definition is absent,266 great
clarity exists with respect to congressional intent regarding the refugee definition
and U.S. asylum law as a whole. An examination of the statute reveals that the
current “particular social group” definition is not in keeping with the history, context, or goals of the 1980 Refugee Act that created it. As such, the BIA’s interpretation of the term cannot be considered reasonable under Chevron.
First, there is no question that Congress intended that the Refugee Act “be
interpreted in conformance with the [1967] Protocol’s definition.”267 As the Supreme Court stated in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of ‘refugee’ and indeed the entire 1980 Act it is that one of
Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee
law into conformance with the [Protocol] . . . Indeed, the definition of ‘refugee’ that Congress adopted . . . is virtually identical
to the one prescribed by Article 1(2) of the Convention . . .268
As such, the phrase “particular social group” must be understood within the
broader context of a statute that both originated in international law and sought to

263. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 977
(1992) (emphasis added).
264. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 321 (2014) (citing Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)). See also Albuquerque Indian Rights v. Lujan, 930 F.2d 49, 59
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (explaining that the canons of construction in [the court’s] review of administrative
decisions [is] normally . . . limited to determining whether or not the agency interpretation is ‘rational and consistent with the statute’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
265. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388 (1999); Pharm. Res. & Mfrs. of Am.
v. FTC, 790 F.3d 198, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Vill. of Barrington v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636
F.3d 650, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
266. See supra note 26.
267. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437 (1987).
268. Id. at 436. The Court added that “there were . . . many statements indicating Congress’
intent that the new statutory definition of ‘refugee’ be interpreted in conformance with the Protocol’s
definition.” Id. at 437.
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maintain a strong connection between domestic asylum law and international refugee law.
Moreover, Congress passed the Refugee Act in 1980, nearly thirty years after
“particular social group” was defined in the Refugee Convention. In the intervening time, both international bodies and States had begun to give meaning to the
otherwise ambiguous term. Thus, “although the United States Congress may not
have articulated the meaning it intended for social group-based persecution, a substantial body of academic, administrative, and judicial interpretations of this term
had developed, and Congress gave no indication that it intended to reject those
developments.”269
As Professor Bassina Farbenblum has explained, “the Refugee Act is one of
a small number of incorporative statutes that directly incorporate international
treaty language and concepts into U.S. domestic law.”270 Yet the Board of Immigration Appeals’ definition of “particular social group” has caused “domestic asylum law [to] become jurisprudentially unmoored from international refugee
law.”271 The United States’ particular social group requirements are now significantly more stringent than those applied in every other developed country;272 they
also disregard the approach suggested by UNHCR. The increasing detachment
from international jurisprudence created by the Board of Immigration Appeals’
interpretation of PSG squarely contravenes congressional intent.
Lastly, in addition to seeking to align domestic and international refugee law,
Congress also passed the Refugee Act with a recognition of the underlying aims
of the statute.273 As the BIA itself recognized, “it is important to keep in mind the
fundamental humanitarian concerns of asylum law.”274 The court noted that “in
enacting the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress sought to bring the Act’s definition
of ‘refugee’ into conformity with the United Nations Convention and Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees and, in so doing, give ‘statutory meaning to our
national commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns.’”275 And as a
result of this context, the Board held that the asylum system should “afford a generous standard for protection in cases of doubt,” an axiom that should extend to
the definition of “particular social group.”276 Despite its prior benevolent

269. Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due
to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 505, 514 (1993).
270. Farbenblum, supra note 53, at 1069.
271. Id. at 1059.
272. See Marouf, supra note 44, at 56–57.
273. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 § 101(a) (1980) (“The Congress declares that it is the historic policy of the United States to respond to the urgent needs of
persons subject to persecution in their homelands, including, where appropriate, humanitarian assistance for their care and maintenance in asylum areas.”).
274. In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 492 (B.I.A. 1998).
275. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4, as reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 144).
276. Id.
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language, the effect of, and perhaps arguably the motivation behind, the BIA’s
imposition of additional requirements onto the Acosta immutability test has been
to exclude many in need from lifesaving legal protections.277
In sum, the Board of Immigration Appeals’ PSG definition is not in keeping
with either the intent of Congress to conform the Refugee Act to international law,
specifically the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, and to comport with international obligations. It also disregards the humanitarian underpinnings of U.S.
asylum law. Consequently, when considering the history of the statute in which
PSG was established and “the broader context of the statute as a whole” the
Board’s interpretation of the phrase “particular social group” must be unreasonable under Chevron Step Two.278
ii. The BIA’s Definition Cannot Be Reasonable Because It Has
Defined the Particular Social Group out of Existence
As the Supreme Court has stated, “[e]ven under Chevron’s deferential framework, agencies must operate ‘within the bounds of reasonable interpretation.’”279 Reasonableness, as mentioned above, has no precise definition, but increasingly, “[a]rguments for narrowing Chevron at Step Two call for a more
searching analysis regarding what should constitute a ‘reasonable’ interpretation.”280
A growing number of courts are placing limits on what constitutes reasonable
for Chevron purposes. For example, “[a]gencies are not free, under Chevron, to
generate erratic, irreconcilable interpretations of their governing statutes.”281 The
D.C. Circuit stated that deference is not “owed to any agency action that is based
on an agency’s purported expertise where the agency’s explanation for its action
lacks any coherence.”282 When an agency interprets a statutory term in a manner
that conflicts with its prior positions and does not provide an plausible explanation

277. See, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (1997) (noting that “divorcing international and domestic law tends to
operate to the grave detriment of asylum-seekers.”). See also Farbenblum, supra note 53, at 1121
(“Interpreting the INA consistently with the Convention will invariably provide a more rights-protective framework than the domestic immigration statute alone.”).
278. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 321 (2014). See also Negusie v. Holder,
555 U.S. 511, 518 (2009) (holding that “concepts of international law . . . may be persuasive in
determining whether a particular agency interpretation is reasonable”).
279. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S. at 321.
280. Walker, supra note 245, at 118. See also Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1411 (2017) (“The Supreme Court has shown
substantially greater willingness to invalidate agency interpretations at Chevron step two.”).
281. Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 920 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J., dissenting)
(citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987)).
282. Fox v. Clinton, 684 F.3d 67, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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for that departure, Chevron deference may not apply.283 Lastly, an unreasonable
outcome may also cause an agency’s interpretation to fail at Step Two.284
In Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-, the BIA satisfied federal
courts’ concerns about the social visibility element by clarifying the requirement
and renaming it social distinction. However, the Board has still not provided an
explanation for the tension between the social distinction and particularity elements. In fact, in both Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- the court conceded the “considerable overlap” between particularity and social distinction and
could not offer an example of a group that would be both socially distinct and
particular.285 Even DHS has advocated for the two requirements to be combined.286
In Mellouli v. Lynch, a case considering whether possession of drug paraphernalia was a deportable offense, the Supreme Court held that if an agency’s interpretation does not lead to a sensible outcome, deference is not appropriate.287 The
Board of Immigration Appeals’ definition of particular social group has led to a
result that, like in Mellouli, “makes scant sense.”288 It has crafted a definition of
particular social group whose requirements—social distinction and particularity—
are mutually exclusive. This has led to only two PSGs being recognized since the
imposition of the new elements, both of which have since been overruled by attorneys general largely on social distinction and particularity grounds.
As the Supreme Court stated in Judulang v. Holder, “[t]he BIA may well have
legitimate reasons for [making a decision, b]ut still, it must do so in some rational
way. . . . [T]he BIA’s approach must be tied, even if loosely, to the purposes of
the immigration laws or the appropriate operation of the immigration system.”289
Here, the Board has effectively defined the particular social group out of existence,
which is neither a rational nor a reasonable result. It is, like in Judulang, an outcome “unmoored from the purposes and concerns of the immigration laws. . . . [I]t

283. See Nat’l Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (finding that an “[u]nexplained inconsistency is . . . a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice”).
284. See Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for
Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 315 (1996).
285. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 240 (B.I.A. 2014); In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N.
Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2014).
286. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 253 n.11 (explaining that DHS “argued for
the combination of the ‘social visibility’ and ‘particularity’ requirements into a single ‘social distinction’ requirement because of the close relationship between the two concepts”).
287. 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1982 (2015). The Court explained that the Board’s decision led to “[t]he
incongruous upshot . . . that an alien is not removable for possessing a substance controlled only under Kansas law, but he is removable for using a sock to contain that substance.” Id. It ultimately held
that, because the BIA’s decision “makes scant sense, [its] interpretation is owed no deference under
the doctrine described in Chevron.” Id.
288. Id.
289. 565 U.S. 42, 55 (2011).
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is not supported by text or practice or cost considerations. The BIA’s approach
therefore cannot pass muster under ordinary principles of administrative law.”290
iii. The Rule of Lenity
Lastly, another consideration relevant to the Chevron analysis is the rule of
lenity, a principle of statutory interpretation originating in criminal law that requires a court to construe ambiguity in the manner most favorable to the defendant.291 The rule of lenity was first applied in the immigration context in Fong Haw
Tan v. Phelan, when the Supreme Court stated that because “deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile,” deportation provisions should be strictly construed in favor of the noncitizen.292 As the Court
explained, “since the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume
that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the
narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.”293
The rule of lenity is firmly established in immigration law.294 Its relationship
to Chevron, however, is more uncertain. In 2017, the Supreme Court declined to
decide whether Chevron deference or the rule of lenity should be prioritized.295
When to consider the rule of lenity also remains an open question. As Professor
David Rubenstein has noted, courts’ “treatment of the issue has . . . been quite
varied. Indeed, just about every conceivable approach has been employed or

290. Id. at 64.
291. Rule of Lenity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining the rule of lenity as
the “judicial doctrine holding that a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out
multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment”).
292. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). Deportation can lead to more than exile;
in certain cases, it can lead to death. See, e.g., Sarah Stillman, When Deportation is a Death Sentence,
NEW YORKER (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/when-deportationis-a-death-sentence [https://perma.cc/ZEV2-GYBL]; Chris Gelardi, The Tragic Story of Jimmy Aldaoud, Deported from the Streets of Detroit to His Death in Iraq, INTERCEPT (Aug. 8, 2019),
https://theintercept.com/2019/08/08/ice-deportation-iraq-jimmy-aldaoud/ [https://perma.cc/P26RDTL7].
293. Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10.
294. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (describing the “longstanding
principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien”);
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND
AMERICA 156 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1987) (stating that the rule of lenity is “[t]he most important
rule of statutory interpretation peculiar to immigration”).
295. Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1572 (2017) (“We have no need to resolve whether the rule of lenity or Chevron receives priority in this case because the statute, read in
context, unambiguously forecloses the Board’s interpretation. Therefore, neither the rule of lenity
nor Chevron applies.”). Many scholars have also analyzed the rule of lenity and its relation to Chevron. See, e.g., Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 1
(2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990).

5_NANASI_45.2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/6/2021 12:12 PM

308

[Vol. 45:260

N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

suggested by the circuit courts . . .”296 Scholars and the Board of Immigration Appeals are similarly divided. Professor Rebecca Sharpless has argued that the rule
of lenity should apply at Step Zero.297 In Matter of Small, Board Member Lory
Rosenberg stated that the rule should apply at Step One.298 Other scholars have
argued that it is applicable at Step Two299 and even “at the very end of the process—after the court determines both that the statute is ambiguous under step one
and [that deference is not warranted because] the agency’s interpretation is unreasonable under step two.”300
Ultimately, while the precise relationship of the rule of lenity to the Chevron
doctrine continues to be debated, what is certain is that the rule serves as another
mitigating factor against any deference to the Board of Immigration Appeals that
would result in draconian outcomes for asylum seekers.
VI.
CONCLUSION
When Congress enacted the Refugee Act in 1980, it declared that asylum
seekers were “of special humanitarian concern to the United States,” and highlighted “the historic policy of the United States to respond to the urgent needs of
persons subject to persecution in their homelands.”301 From its origin, U.S. asylum law was intended to conform with international refugee law, which is an expansive and rights-protective doctrine.302 In generating particular social group jurisprudence that does not allow any applicants to qualify, the Board of
Immigration Appeals has abrogated both its legal and moral responsibilities to
those seeking refuge in the United States.
The particular social group ground is the mechanism by which many who are
facing grave violence at the hands of gangs, their intimate partners, or their

296. David S. Rubenstein, Putting the Immigration Rule of Lenity in Its Proper Place: A Tool
of Last Resort After Chevron, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 479, 502–04 (2007) (identifying nine discrete approaches undertaken by federal courts when attempting to reconcile the rule of lenity and Chevron
deference).
297. See, e.g., Rebecca Sharpless, Zone of Nondeference: Chevron and Deportation for a
Crime, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 323, 377 n.88 (2017) (“Like the criminal rule of lenity, the presumption
against deportation in immigration cases arguably kicks in at Chevron step zero—when courts are
deciding whether Chevron even applies in the first place.”).
298. In re Small, 23 I. & N. Dec. 448, 454 (B.I.A. 2002) (Rosenberg, Mem., dissenting) (stating that the rule of lenity “maintains its currency today and applies even to interpretations of the
plain language of the statute under the first prong of the test prescribed in Chevron”).
299. See, e.g., Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference,
17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 575 (2003) (arguing that the rule of lenity should be considered in Step
Two of the Chevron analysis, as part of a court’s determination of whether an agency’s interpretation
is reasonable).
300. Rubenstein, supra note 296, at 504.
301. Refugee Act of 1980 § 101(a), Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
302. See Farbenblum, supra note 53, at 1063 (noting that the international refugee law framework has a rights-protective purpose).
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families seek solace and protection. Out of a misplaced fear of opening floodgates,
the Board of Immigration Appeals has effectively closed our borders to them. We
must do what we can to save a legal doctrine that stands to save so many lives.303

303. See SHANE DIZON & NADINE WETTSTEIN, IMMIGRATION LAW SERVICE § 10:137 (2d ed.
2008) (“After political opinion claims, the largest body of U.S. asylum and withholding jurisprudence is based upon claims of membership in a particular social group.”).

